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INTRODUCTION

Demands for citizens’ "civil rights" has been a recurrent theme
of contemporary society for nearly twenty years; however, it has not
been until the -last— tive-dfliat^^the -rights. .of-American Indians -h a v e ^ b e e n ^
£accorded-great-attentiij->n.

Perhaps because of the romantic character

istics attributed to them by our fixation on the grand development of
the nation,

the rights of the Indian have become a challenge to the

integrity of the United States,
The story of the development of the country is the story of ac
quisition of Indian lands,

and this paper is a discussion of the ele

ments and activities of the two outstanding contributors to the history
of United States-Indian relations— the Congress of the United States,
and the Supreme Court.

The questions of primary responsibility and the

content of policy will be discussed through chapters on the status of
treaties, acquisition of title to lands, regulatory actions of Congress,
and the Indian Claims Commission,

In each chapter,

significant opin

ions of the Supreme Court determining responsibility and policy will
be considered.

1

CHAPTER I
THE STATUS OF TREATIES IN
INTERNATIONAL AND AMERICAN LAW
Introduction
Treaties perform the same functions in international law that con
stitutions, legislation and contracts do within a sovereign nation.

They

have the authority of law, but are distinguished by a singular dependence
on the good faith of the parties for enforcement.^

In the absence of fac

tors which contribute to enforcement within one nation, such as a unified
political culture and standardized procedure for managing infractions of
legal agreements, "good faith" is at best an ambiguous standard which
varies with the ability of each party to maintain its authority to commit itself and its strength to enforce terms of the commitment.
Thus, though the state might have the capacity to enter into
agreements with other states because of its inherent sover
eignty, it might not have, by its Constitution, the ability
to perform the obligations incurred. [Emphasis supplied.]^
The crisis in American Indian policy was preordained by the nature
of the parties— two highly dissimilar systems of law and culture.

The

sole outstanding similarity was the consciousness each party had of it
self as a sovereign nation.

However, the sovereignty of one was not

James McLeod Hendry, Treaties and Federal Constitutions
D . C . : Public Affairs Press,
2I b i d . , p.

1955), pp.

39.

3I b i d ., p. 96.
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iii-4.

(Washington,

3
mutually recognized by the other, "sovereignty'1 itself was not identi
cally defined, and the title of one "sovereign" tribe to property was
not necessarily acknowledged by any other "sovereign" tribe.

In this

disagreement over sovereignty lies the nemesis of the treaty as a tool
of conducting Indian relations.

It forces us to acknowledge the appli

cability of Toynbee’s statement that the only sanction to performance of
the terms of a treaty is coercion by the stronger power.^
Each tribe regarded land as a tribal inheritance enjoyed in unquali
fied ownership.

The United States regarded land, by reason of the right

of discovery, as owned by the Federal government, and acknowledged only
the t r i b e s ’ use of such land at the grace of the government.

It was ex

tremely rare for Englishmen or Americans to support the tribal contention.
By the end of the Nineteenth Century,

the recognition of tribes as

nationalities having capacity to execute treaties with the United States
was characterized as "a legal fiction" created solely out of necessity”*
by the demands of humanity and pure pragmatism without which "the lordly
savage

[would] forbid the wilderness to blossom like the rose . . . ."^

^Fred L. Israel, ed., Major Peace Treaties of Modern History 16481 9 6 7 , with an Introduction by Arnold Toynbee (New York: Chelsea House
Publishers,

1967), I, xxvii.

^Monroe E. Price, Law and the American Indian, Readings, Notes and
Cases (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1973), p. 372, citing
Indian Land Cessions in the United S tates, 18 United States Bureau of
Ethnology, Pt. 2, pp. 535-555, p a s s i m .
^Price, American Indian , p. 373, citing Indian Land Cessions
of John Quincy Adams, December 22, 1802).

(Oration

4
While it is understandable that Nineteenth Century attitudes would
disqualify tribes as nations in the absence of the standard accoutrements
of European civilization, not all tribes were inadequate in that respect.
Written constitutions probably originated in the Fifteenth Century with
the Iroquois Confederacy.

The Constitution of the Five Nations provided

for specific procedural and substantive requirements, including the rule
of unanimity, a federal structure,
and recall, and male suffrage.^

provisions for initiative,

referendum

Though the majority of tribes operated

under an unwritten code, those which acquired written forms provided ser
vices which we would consider municipal functions: land management,

the

identification of Indians as members of a distinct tribe with heads of
g
state, and judicial determination of illegal actions.
Regardless of these characteristics of an organized society and in
the presence of overwhelming dissimilarities,

treaty making with Indian

tribes was a method of acquiring title on paper to land gained by con
quest.

Treaties were negotiated and executed because English law demanded

compliance with established legal

procedure.

Their purpose was to achieve

settlement of title disputes pursuant to a European system.
This chapter will examine four elements of treaty making with Indian
tribes:

(i) America's inheritance from England,

(ii) constitutional status

^Felix S. Cohen, "How Long Will Indian Constitutions Last?" in The
Legal Conscience, Selected Papers
of Felix S. C o h e n , ed. by Lucy Kramer
Cohen (New Haven: Yale University Press,

^Ibid., pp. 224-28.

1960), p. 222.
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of treaties,

(iii) standard elements in some actual treaties, and (iv)

the philosophical position of the Supreme Court in its early years.
A m e r i c a ’s Inheritance from England
International law accepts the doctrine that the law of a prior sov
ereign is maintained until actively changed by the new sovereign, and
that the nationality of the source is of no special consequence.

The

United States, therefore, was fundamentally an heir of British and Span
ish principles of law and obviously the British influence had greater
9
imp a c t .
The first significant British interest in the position of the In
dians in the colonies was expressed in a report of the Lords of Trade
read before the Council at the Court of St. James on November 23, 1761.
. . .the primary cause of that discontent . . . was the
Cruelty and Injustice with which they had been treated with
respect to their hunting grounds, in open violation of those
solemn compacts by which they had yielded to use the Domin
ion, but not the property of those lands.-*-®
The statement's significance lies in the enunciation of an assumed sover
eignty ("Dominion") of the Crown though the land was maintained by the
tribes.
The acknowledgment that injustices occurred in violation of agree
ments with the tribes was simply an expression of regret since Britain

^Felix S. Cohen,

"The Spanish Origin of Indian Rights in the Law of

the United States," ibid. , p. 248.
lOprice, American Indian, p. 376, citing Indian Land Cessions.

generally ignored the legal status of Indians when making grants and
charters.

Such contracts were made with English subjects and retained

sovereignty in the Crown.

The Plymouth Charter,

for example,

a provision that "the grant is not to include any lands

included

’actually pos

sessed or inhabited by any other Christian prince or s tate,’ but the
Indians are wholly ignored."

11

Realistically, the religious status re

ferred to would indicate that other European claims, even if not held
to be absolute, would be granted serious appraisal, while Indian claims
to title were inconceivable.
An exception to the common absence of mention of tribes is found in
the Maryland Charter.

While their occupancy of part of the land was ac

knowledged and nominal compensation (two arrows) required to take the
land, the colonists were directed to consider tribes as enemies, and the
grant authorized the Governor to wage war against them for the purpose
of "vanquish[ing]11 them.

12

The general characteristics of Bri t a i n ’s Indian policy were,

there

fore, the sovereignty of the Crown over all territorial claims, an acknow
ledgment of the occupancy by Indians of parts of the claimed land and a
legal requirement that compensation be paid for the taking of land from
tribes.

However,

the state, being supreme, had the right to simply "van

quish" the tribes.

1:LI bid. , p. 375.

12Ibid., p. 376.

7
Spanish law, expressed primarily by the Roman Catholic Church,
amplified the definition of the right of the discoverer by the stipu
lation that discovery did not give a right to confiscation of posses
sions, nor did religion or lack thereof have any bearing on rights to
l a n d .13
The United States expressed acceptance of the basic British and
Spanish principles in its establishment of sovereignty over the conti
nent.

In the Northwest Ordinance of 1787,

it expressed "good faith"

toward Indians and guaranteed them possession of land and property unless
they consented otherwise,"*-^ and in Article VI of the Treaty of April 30,
1803 for the cession of Louisiana from France it guaranteed property
rights of the inhabitants of the Louisiana Territory:
Art. VI.
The United States promise to execute such trea
ties and articles as may have been agreed between Spain
and the tribes and nations of Indians, until by mutual
consent of the United States and the said tribes or na
tions, other suitable articles shall have been agreed
upon.
Constitutional Status of Treaties
An administrative system to execute Ame r i c a ’s philosophy of sover
eignty over Indian lands was established by constitutional provisions for
treaty making and management of United States-tribal relations.

The power

l % e l i x S. Cohen, "Indian Claims," in Legal Conscience, p. 268-69.
l^Cohen,

"Spanish Origin," i b i d ., p. 242.

l^Felix S. Cohen,
p. 280, n. 16.

"Original Indian Title," in Legal Conscience,

8
to make treaties with the advice and consent of the Senate, as well as
general conduct of foreign relations,
Article II, Section 2.

However,

is granted to the Executive by

since Indian tribes were not regarded

strictly as foreign nations, the Constitution grants to Congress in
Article I, Section 8 the responsibility for dealing with tribes.
cle I, Section 10 forbids treaty-making by states,

Arti

guaranteeing Federal

control over the matter.
In actual practice, the United States adheres to the monistic
theory of treaties— if validly made they become law without further
action.

16

process.

However,

there are several elements which complicate the

Neither the President nor Congress is prohibited from qualify

ing, ignoring or revoking a treaty at any t i m e . ^

Congress may, for

example, invalidate a previously ratified treaty by legislation inconsistent with its terms.

18

And the activities of the Foreign Relations

Committee and of individual Senators as representatives of the United
States during informal negotiations may have significant impact on the
19
treaty process.

Finally, enforcement of treaties may be impeded when

1 f\

The opposing dualistic theory is followed in Canada where trea
ties must be embodied in a statute.
(Hendry, Treaties, p. 14.)
■^Louis Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution (Mineola, New
York: The Foundation Press, Inc., 1972), p. 133, citing U.S. v. CurtissWright Corporation, 299 U.S. 304 (1936); U.S. v. B e lmont, 301 U.S. 324
(1937); U.S. v. P i n k , 315 U.S. 203 (1942); Youngstown Sheet and Tube C o .
v. S a w y e r , 343 U.S. 579

(1952).

■^Hendry, Treaties, p. 91.
-^Henkin, Foreign A f f a i r s , p. 131.

the legislative branch and/or individual states are obligated to perform
some function,

20

thereby expanding the scope of negotiation into other

political arenas and decreasing the likelihood of completing good faith
agreements in a timely fashion.
The judicial responsibility is based upon provisions in Article
VI, Section 2 providing that treaties,

the Constitution and laws are the

supreme law of the land, and in Article II, Section 2 extending the judi
cial power thereto.
The judiciary may stipulate proper subjects of international negotiation,

21

but typically removes itself from consideration of the provi

sions of actual treaties.

For example, whether the courts have the power

to declare the terms of a treaty void and unenforceable has not been clarified,

22

nor has the judicial acceptability of a treaty requiring passage

of some legislative program affecting the United States.^3
The judicial responsibility arises in treaty performance,

"to ascer

tain whether the treaty-making authority has acted constitutionally when
it allegedly infringed some right of a subject . . . [J]udicial interference

^Hendry,

Treaties, p. 7.

^ I b i d . , p. 72, citing Degeogroy v. R i g g s , 133 U.S. 258 (1890).
^ I b id. , p. 91, citing U. S. v. R e i d , 73 Fed.
23

(2nd) (U.S.) 153, p. 155.

Ibid., citing Bacardi Corps of America v. D o m e n e c h , 311 U.S.

150

(1940); Fujii v. California 217 Pacific 2nd (U.S.) 481; (Calif. Appeals,
1950) overruled by (1952) 242 Pacific 2nd (U.S.) 617; 38 Calif. 2nd 718.

10
in the treaty process cannot arise until after a fait accompli." [Emphasis supplied.J

24

Since the power of the Court to declare the terms of a treaty void
and unenforceable is doubtful,

courts have adhered consistently to a

policy of "judicial self-abnegation."

Treaties are normally regarded

as political questions inappropriate for adjudication and best left to
the executive and legislative realms.
allegedly

violated,

However,

if private rights are

the court’s duty is to pass on the constitutionality

of the treaty involved.

The most effective challenges are based on in-

fringements of preferred freedoms.

25

However, no treaty has been found

unconstitutional by any American court and few have been seriously chali
j 26
lenged.

There are some exceptions to the court’s abnegation; for example,
where a procedural question arises,
be resolved,

28

97

where "doubtful expressions" are to

where the amount of compensation is questioned, and where

24
Hendry, Treaties, p. 67.
25
Henkin,
) fi

Foreign A f f a i r s , p. 137.

Hendry, Treaties, p. 72, citing In re Cooper, Ware v. H y l t o n ,

U. S. v. R e i d , U. S. v. Thompson.
77

Price, American Indian, pp. 419-20, citing U. S. v. Santa Fe Pacific
R. C o ., in which the Court determined whether Congress had in fact authorized
extinguishment of title.
^ Ibid. , citing Choate v. T r a p p , 224 U.S.

665, 675 (1912)

11
Congress has specifically given the court jurisdiction in a particular
claim.

29

These exceptions are the fundamental standards of jurisprudence
regarding Indian property rights,

and have served as consistent stan

dards for equitable relief of tribal grievances and management of In
dian affairs.

Generally,

the position of the Supreme Court has been

to support both the body of law inherited from England, principally the
right of the discoverer with necessity of compensation, and the consti
tutional grant of authority to Congress.
and remedy of conflict.

Its position is both the source

Since the action of the legislative branch is

final as long as it conforms to procedural requirements and fairness,
treaties can be overriden by act of Congress.
lieve a particular complaint,

While the Court can re

it does not have the power to direct the

Congressional management of the treaty process.

29

Ibid. In addition, the Department of State is a source of gui
dance to the judiciary in rendering its determination of whether the case
involves a political question.
Hendry, Treaties, p. 72.
"An indication by the Dept, of State to the judiciary that it
is an impolitic or embarassing agreement, and a subsequent de
termination that the treaty is not self-executing would be a
possible way for the executive to repudiate such an obligation.
Such a method would be a breach of international law, however,
as the treaty is internationally valid on constitutional con
clusion."
Hendry, T reaties, p. 103, n. 29. "For a determina
tion of the question of self-executing and non-self-executing
treaties see Marshall's opinion in Foster v. N e i l s o n , 2 Pet. 233,
314 (U. S. 1829)." H e n d r y , T r e a t i e s , p. 10.

Standard Elements

in Treaties

The geographical expansion of the colonists demanded a government
policy toward orderly acquisition of Indian land.

The need was fulfilled

by the passage of the Act of July 22, 1790 requiring a treaty to validate
transfers of Indian land to the United States, and a special act of Congress for the sale of tribal land.

30

With the end of the War of 1812

American pioneers considered the move westward with less anxiety and pro
mulgated the pretense of Indian tribes as independent nations in order
to effectuate the treaty-making policy.

31

Between 1789 and 1850 alone

245 treaties were concluded for the purchase of 450 million acres of land
at $.20 per acre.

32

At the height of the great crossing of the Plains,

Indian Commissioners were established by executive order to negotiate
treaties with reluctant tribes, and though negotiations were completed a c 
quisition of property was only determined by successful military expeditions
Certainly an element which illustrated the inappropriateness of the
treaty method was the incompatability of language.

30

Although tribal repre-

Cohen, "Spanish Origin," Legal Conscience, p. 236. However,

if lands

had been individualized under conditions of ownership for a certain period
of time, usually 25 years, or with the approval of the Secretary of the In
terior, a special act was not needed.
31

Israel, Major Peace Treaties, with a Commentary by Emanuel Chill,

II, 664.
37

Notes, "Systematic Discrimination in the Indian Claims Commission:
The Burden of Proof in Redressing Historical Wrongs," Iowa Law Re v i e w , Vol.
No. 5 (June,

1972), p. 1302.

-^Israel, Major Peace T r eaties, p. 665.
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sentatives signed various documents,
provisions eluded them.

34

the meaning of the elaborate legal

Generally, the parties declared perpetual

peace and friendship and promised each other assistance in just wars and
service as a source of information on the activities of other hostiles.
A system of trade was established and both parties agreed not to punish
citizens of the other.
More detailed terms had great impact on the control and ownership
of lands and demanded a clear and precise understanding of legal obliga
tions, which may or may not have been present, and which most certainly
were violated by both parties.
Under the Delaware Indian Treaty of September 17, 1778, the tribe
agreed to give free passage to American troops and to provide food and
supplies to them upon compensation.

The United States stipulated that

if other tribes should join the agreement, the Delawares would become
the chieftains of all and have representation in Congress, and guaranteed
"all their territoreal

[sic] rights in the fullest and most ample manner,

as it hath been bounded by former treaties,

as long as they . . . shall

abide by, and hold fast the chain of friendship now entered into."

35

The Treaty of Fort Greenville of August 3, 1795 clarified the guar
anty of territorial rights by defining the term "relinquishment of claims".
Article VI of the treaty stated:

34I b i d ., p. 664.

33Ibid. , pp. 669-71.
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. . . but when those tribes, or any of them, shall be dis
posed to sell their lands, or any part of them, they are to
be sold only to the United States; and until such sale, the
United States will protect all the said Indian tribes in the
quiet enjoyment of their lands against all citizens of the
United States, and against all other white persons who in
trude upon the same.
And the said Indian tribes again ac
knowledge themselves to be under the protection of the said
United States and no other power whatever.
By this definition,

relinquishment of tribal lands clearly imposed Fed

eral control over the property but it also created the basis for com
plete Federal acquisition against the interest of the tribes.

Techni

cally, the only right guaranteed the Indians was the right of occupancy.
As long as the land was used as a home by the tribes it was available to
their use

in perpetuity; however, once the land was abandoned,

volved to

the government and the tribe had no claim to the land.

To compensate the tribe,

title

de

the United States specifically relinquished

its claim to "all other Indian lands" with certain exceptions and provided
payment by a guaranty of goods valued at $20,000 in the first year and
$9,500 in

every following year.

However, the boundary lines for the land

ceded and

paid for were established in only a general way.

Exact surveys

were to be taken after the fact in accordance with the provisions of the
treaty and supervised by Indian representatives.

37

In sum, all treaties contained provisions which acknowledged Fed
eral ownership of land,

36I b i d ., p. 678.
37I b i d . , p. 673.

Indian occupancy of land, granted some form of

15
compensation,

usually in goods, and stipulated the events which would

terminate the protected Indian occupancy of the land.

38

However,

treaty-

making was conducted in a highly unstable environment and the 1832 Treaty
of P a y n e s ’ Landing exemplifies the problems involved.

Under its terms,

a delegation of six members of the Florida Seminoles was chosen to in
spect land in Arkansas for prospective relocation.

Their authority was

limited to reporting their findings to tribal leaders and not to commit
the tribe to any agreement.

Despite their unfavorable opinion,

the repre

sentatives were pressured into signing an agreement requiring the tribe
to move to the Arkansas land.

The agreement was upheld as part of the

treaty and ratified by the Senate.
the terms of the Treaty, war ensued.

When the government tried to enforce
39

The tremendous obstacles of language, understanding,

capacity to

carry out terms, and blatant violations of terms were all elements of
the treaty process.

The result of the system, however, was the acquisi

tion by the United States of title to all lands within its boundaries and
the defeat of Indian sovereignty.

^ O t h e r treaties included special provisions which recompensed the
United States for expenses incurred as the result of a war in violation
of a prior treaty, promised special gifts to the tribes upon information
leading to discovery of valuable minerals and granted supervisory author
ity to tribal leaders.
See Treaty of Fort Jackson, August 9, 1914, Israel,
Major Peace Treaties, p. 691; Treaty of Fort Armstrong, September 21, 1832,
i b i d . , p. 714.
39Notes, "Systematic Discrimination," p. 1302, n. 31, citing Blumenthal,
pp. 104-106.
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Philosophical Position of the Supreme Court
The validity of the treaty-making process was dependent on two
processes— the negotiation and execution of agreements and the separate
policy and action of Congress.

While treaties were constitutionally

recognized as part of the supreme law of the land,

the administration

of Indian relations was granted to the legislature.

This dual approach

\

to Indian affairs,

treaty-making and legislation,

is the major source of

litigation and, consequently* the major theme of judicial debate.
As the final authority on constitutional and legal questions,
Supreme Court has rendered definitions of the status of treaties,

the

tribes,

and the boundaries of Congressional authority in its management of tri
bal lands.

Notwithstanding the Court's opinions,

the treaty process re

mained a complicated and chameleon-like approach to acquiring title.
While the opinions themselves illustrate the legal questions involved,
the facts behind each case illustrate the complexities and inherent
failure of the treaty-making process as a just solution, and its success
in attaining the goal of Federal ownership and control of property.
The Supreme Court defined the relationship of treaties and statutes
in Cherokee Tobacco*^ finding that treaties have "no higher sanctity" and
"are no more obligatory" when made with Indian tribes than in any other
international relationship,^1 and are therefore subject to Congressional

4 0 78 U.S.

(11 Wall.)

616 (1870).

^ P r i c e , American Indian, p. 420, citing Cherokee T o bacco.
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invalidation.
ity, i.e.

While thus providing a simple legal standard of valid

the most contemporary is valid,

the Court did not clarify

the rea.1 problem of a consistent and just approach to acquisition of
tribal lands.

It was constitutionally prohibited from doing so as its

function is not legislative in nature.

But the effect of the decision

was to negate a validly executed document which should have been honored
in all respects.
The case arose from a conflict between Article 10 of the Treaty of
1866 and Section 107 of the Act of 1868.

The Treaty granted the Chero-

kees the right to sell any product without paying a tax "levied on quan
tity sold outside of the Indian territory."

The Act established a tax on

liquor and tobacco produced anywhere within the United States.
concile the conflicting policies,

42

To re

the Court first expressed the unchanging

nature of the Constitution in the face of both treaty and statute.

Neither

changes the Constitution and both must fall if they violate the Constitu
tion.

Since both treaty and statute,

in the case at hand, were valid and

legal obligations, one or the other had to fall.
fically granting authority to Congress,

The Constitution speci

the Act of 1868 superseded the pro

visions of the Treaty and the Cherokees were subject to taxation.
The consequences in all such cases give rise to questions
which must be met by the political department of the gov
ernment.
They are beyond the sphere of judicial cognizance.
In the case under consideration the act of Congress must pre
vail as if the treaty were not an element to be considered. If

42Ibid., p. 421.

18
a wrong has been done the power of redress is with Con
gress, not with the judiciary . . . .
. . . The burden must rest s o m e w h e r e . ^
Cherokee Tobacco resulted in an acknowledgment that though treaties
express obligations made in good faith they cannot be depended upon, the
ability to abrogate any terms being a constitutionally recognized right
of Congress.

However,

the standard of good faith was not to be lightly

violated by state authority.
An 1831 opinion in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia is famous for its ex
pression of federalist doctrine rejecting casual violation of the terms
of federal treaties with tribes.

44

The opinion written by Chief Justice

John Marshall found that a tribe could not maintain an action in federal
courts as it was neither a state nor a foreign nation, but that Indians
are "domestic dependent nations" under the sovereignty of the United
States.

As such,

they have an unquestionable right to their land until

they voluntarily yield their title to the United States.
The case arose out of an attempt by Georgia to remove the Creek and
Cherokee Indians outside its western boundary.

While Federal policy had

been to gradually purchase all of the tribal lands and include them within

/^

I b i d ., p. 422, citing the C o u r t ’s opinion per Justice Swayne.

^ A l f r e d H. Kelly and Winfred A. Harbison, The American Constitution—
Its Origins and Development (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, I n c . , 1970)»
p. 301.

45Ibid., p. 303.

19
Geo r g i a ’s jurisdiction,

the Cherokee Nation adopted a written constitu

tion in 1827 proclaiming themselves an independent state.

Impatient

for the completion of Federal acquisition and assignment of the land
and in the face of the Cherokee action, Georgia extended state law over
the Indian territory, declared all Indian law null and void, and di
rected the seizure of the lands.
tried,

Pursuant to Georgia’s laws, the state

convicted and executed an Indian

(Corn Tassel) despite a writ of

error granted by the Supreme Court after the trial.

The Governor of

Georgia declared absolute resistance to all interference with Georgia ’s
courts and since President Jackson refused to act on behalf of the tribe
an injunction was sought to restrain the state.

46

Although in the C ourt’s opinion the tribe had no standing to bring
a suit before it, it legitimized tribal rights pursuant to.federal trea
ties and reaffirmed Federal supremacy over state authority.

Since the

case had no legally binding outcome in the absence of valid standing of
the tribe, the conflict between Georgia and the Cherokee Nation was not
resolved.

In a supplementary decision, the Court was able to render a

legally binding opinion.

In Worcester v. Georgia

(1832), Marshall again

held against the state, finding that the Cherokee nation was a separate
and distinct political community which could be entered only upon the
tribe’s consent or "in conformity with treaties and acts of Congress."47
Federal law, therefore, dominates both Indian and state law.

46Ibid., p. 302.

47Ibid., p. 303.
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In this instance,

Georgia had established a licensing system for

non-Indians residing on Indian lands,

A trader was tried and convicted

for violation of the system and appealed his conviction.

Here, a pri

vate, non-Indian individual was involved and these facts contributed to
the clear statement of Federal authority and acknowledgment of Indian
rights.

However, when Marshall implied an executive duty to implement

the decision, his caution was ignored by both Jackson and Georgia.

The

Cherokee's cause was resolved only when the tribe ceded its lands by anLO
other treaty and migrated west of the Mississippi River. °
Having affirmed Congressional authority to make and break treaties,
and the supremacy of Federal authority in Indian relations,

the question

of the extent of administrative power held by Congress remained.

Trea

ties could be revoked, but could Congressional authority be assigned to
administrative agencies and how was the language of treaties to be inter
preted?
In Cherokee Nation y. Hitchcock

49

the Court found that Congress had

the power to grant specific authority to administrative agencies in its
management of Indian relations and that the meaning of terms of treaties
could be interpreted by the Congress,

The case involved consideration of

two treaties with the Cherokee made in 1835 and 1846, and a Congressional
statute of 1898 which authorized the Secretary of the Interior to lease

48ibid.
4 9 187 U.S. 294

(1902).
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mineral and oil rights on land granted to the Cherokees pursuant to
the treaties.
The tribe challenged the statute by alleging that the Treaty of
1835 had granted them a "fee simple interest" in the land in question
and the right,

through their governing council,

all necessary laws to regulate the land.
ever,

51

to make and execute

Under the Treaty of 1846, h o w 

the Cherokees were required to make laws for equal protection under

the law and for the security of life, liberty and property.

52

The Court’s opinion by Justice White refused to enjoin the Secretary
of the Interior from pursuing the leasing arrangements.

Citing the Report

of the Senate Committee on the Five Civilized Tribes of Indians,

the

Court accepted the interpretation that the 1846 obligation of the tribe
to provide for equal protection under the law meant "equitable participa
tion in the common property of the tribe".

It also accepted the doctrine

of federal responsibility to provide for "equitable participation" in the
absence of tribal action.

"^Price, American Indian, p. 422.
-^Ibid. "An absolute or fee simple estate is one in which the owner is
entitled to the entire property, with unconditional power of disposition dur
ing his life, and descending to his heirs and legal representatives upon his
death intestate."
Henry Campbell Black, M.A., B l a c k ’s Law Dictionary (St.
Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1957).
52

Price, American Indian, p. 423.

■^Report of May 7, 1894, Sen, Rep. No.

377, 53rd Cong.

2d sess.

5^Price, American Indian, p. 423, citing Cherokee Nation v. Hitc h c o c k .
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The Court then considered the question whether the 1898 Act was a
valid exercise of Congress’ power and found that since Indian tribes are
directly subject to the legislative power of the United States and are
by treaty under Federal authority, no treaty with the Cherokees had
freed them from dependency on Congress.

Congress,

therefore, had a le

gitimate power to authorize the Secretary of the Interior to lease Indian lands.

55

The power existing in Congress to administer upon and guard
the tribal property, and the power being political a n d ,ad
ministrative in its nature, the manner of its exercise is a
question within the province of the legislative branch to
determine, and is not one for the c o u r t s . ^
Congress may clearly administer tribal lands in any way it sees fit
and it may interpret the terms of a treaty contrary to the Indian under
standing of the agreement.

While general language can be read with

ease permitting diverse interpretations,

specific language in treaties

allows little flexibility and sharpens the issues when challenged.

The

Supreme Court has found that even specific terms of agreement with tribes
can be validly and haphazardly rescinded by Congress.
In Lone Wolf v. Hi t c h c o c k , t h e

Court reaffirmed tribal dependence

on the Federal government and Congressional authority to manage tribal
lands even where by treaty tribal lands could not be ceded by further

^^Price, American Indian, p. 424.
"^ I b i d . , p. 425, citing Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock.
57187 U.S. 553

(1903).

treaty unless voted upon and agreed to by a majority of tribal members.
In this case, an 1867 treaty specifically limited the power of an 1892
treaty to convey title, and the Congressional statute in the interme-*
diate years had specifically guaranteed the good faith of the government by virtue by any treaty executed prior to 1871.
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By the Treaty of Medicine Lodge of 1867, it was agreed that the
lands held by the Kiowa and Comanche tribes could not be ceded by fur
ther treaty unless approved by three-fourths of the adult male Indians
occupying the land.

In 1892, 456 tribal members signed an agreement to

sell 2.5 million acres of the same land to the Federal government.

Dur

ing the Senate consideration of the treaty in 1899, the Secretary of the
Interior pointed out that the required three-fourths approval had not been
met, but the treaty was accepted notwithstanding the 1867 treaty arrange
ments or the 1871 statute guaranteeing good faith toward pre-1871 treaties.
In an appeal to the Court for an injunction against implementation
of the cession of land,

the Court considered whether the lands held un

der the 1867 Treaty of Medicine Lodge fell within the protection of the
Fifth Amendment and consequently within the jurisdiction of the Court.
The Court found that the lands did not have this protection and that, In
dians being dependents of the Federal government and Indian lands being

“^Price, American I ndian, p. 425, citing Act of March 3, 1871 ending
treaty making with Indian tribes.
^Price,

American I n dian, p. 425.
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protected only from state and individual encroachment,

Congress had a

plenary right to determine the best means of managing the lands.
When, therefore, treaties were entered into between the
United States and a tribe of Indians it was never doubted
that the power to abrogate existed in Congress, and that
in a contingency such power might be availed of from con
siderations of governmental policy, particularly if con
sistent with perfect good faith towards the I n d i a n s . ^
Although the Act of March 3, 1871 had declared Congressional inten
tion to honor the terms of treaties, the Court reaffirmed Congress' power
to choose the manner in which good faith agreement would be executed.
The sale of lands in open violation of the terms of the Treaty,

61

lacking

the required consent of tribal members, was defined as "a mere change in
the form of investment of Indian tribal property,

the property of those

who, as we have held, were in substantial effect the wards of the govern
ment."
In any event, as Congress possessed full power in the matter,
the judiciary cannot question or inquire into the motives
which prompted the enactment of this legislation [the Treaty
of 1892].
If
be understood
power, relief
dress and not

^ I b i d . , pp.

injury was occasioned, which we do not wish to
as implying, by the use made by Congress of its
must be sought by an appeal to that body for re62
to the courts.

426-27,

citing Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock.

61I b i d . , p. 427.
^ I b i d . , p. 428, citing Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock.

25
Although in prior decisions the Court had held that ambiguous expressions in treaties should be resolved in favor of the Indians,

63

Lone

Wolf has the effect of declaring specific protections in the Indians b e 
half and limitations on the treaty-making power to be invalid.
Congress chooses to rescind general or specific language,

Where

it may do so

with impunity and good faith negotiation becomes meaningless.
The philosophical position of the Supreme Court affirmed the equal
status of treaties and statutes, the absence of legal standing of tribes
without special jurisdictional act of Congress,
pancy against state and individual encroachment.

and tribal right of occu
It also affirmed the su

preme authority of Congress to execute its constitutional responsibility to
conduct Indian relations in a manner of its choosing without limitation.
The Court's task was an unpleasant job of untangling the web of in
numerable treaties and statutes, but its standards to dispose of cases
were clearcut.

There is little doubt as to the outcome of any grievance

against Federal management of property— the United States owned the land
and had the powers of a landlord over tribal occupancy.

The greatest con

tribution of the Court in these cases was to clearly establish the powers
of the Federal authority,

a contribution essential to the unification of

the country, but which reflects poorly on the process of "good faith" agree
ments with the Indian Nation.

Cohen, "Spanish Origin," Legal Conscience, p. 244, no. 39, citing
Worcester c. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515 (1832); The Kansas Indians, 5 Wall 737
(1866); Winters v. U . S . , 207 U.S. 564

(1908).

CHAPTER II
THE ACQUISITION OF TITLE TO PROPERTY
InLruduction
The Fifth Amendment requires that private property shall not be
taken without just compensation.
in the A m e n d m e n t , i.e.

Two of the three substantive factors

the act of taking and just compensation, have

been the subject of great controversy in the courts.

The history of

the Supreme Court contains numerous examples of the application of due
process of law to property rights, and here will be examined in appli
cation to the Indian, who for most of our history has been considered
a political and cultural' alien and has been managed constitutionally
under special Congressional powers of foreign relations.
Due process of law, requiring fair procedures,
protection of property rights.
ply to aliens,

is a constitutional

Although the Bill of Rights did not ap

the due process requirement of fair procedures can be

considered a limitation on foreign relations since it is applied uni1
versally in government structures.
While emphasis is currently placed on exploitation of Indian tribes
with the implication that land was simply confiscated,

a defense can be

made against the charge on the basis of documented purchase,
to valid procedure,

i.e.

pursuant

treaty or other agreement, of approximately

^Henkin, Foreign A f f a i r s , p. 255.
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o
95% of the land acquired by the United States.

This defense does not

exonerate recognized abuses including fraud and coercion; its signifi
cance lies in the adherence to procedure and compulsory payment in or
der to legalize such transactions.
This chapter discusses the conceptual framework encompassing ac
quisition of title against Indian claims,
Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence,

consisting of several factors:

the Eighteenth Century translation of natural

law and Puritan ethic into American law, and the Supreme C o u r t ’s inter
pretation of title acquisition,
Anglo-Saxon Jurisprudence
The recognition of Federal title to Indian lands originated in in
ternational law in the doctrine of discovery and was of primary signifi
cance in America's English heritage.

The period of European exploration

and colonization required the development of a justification for the
taking of uncivilized lands and that justification is known as the rule
of the discoverer.

Briefly,

discovery of land gives title to the sov

ereign whose subjects made the discovery.

The title is good against all

other sovereigns though the natives of the land are considered the right
ful occupants thereof.

Their use of the land is uninhibited subject to a

curtailment of the right to dispose of the land without the approval of
the sovereign.

^Cohen,

"Indian Claims," Legal Conscience, p. 269.
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Chief Justice Catron in State v. Foreman

3

identified the right

of the discoverer as an accepted principle of international law.

While

perhaps morally questionable as serving ultimate justice, it is never
theless the law of the land.
Refined sensibility and elevated philanthropy may hold
what it will, the truth is, neither our theory or prac
tice has ever allowed to the Indians, any political
right extending beyond our pleasure . . . .
Theirs is
not a case of conscience before this court, but a case
A
of law.
Pursuant to this right of discovery, the United States held exclu
sive title and could dispose of the land by purchase or conquest at its
discretion,

subject only to the Indian right of occupancy."’

United

States sovereignty originated with Great Britain which had claimed title
through John Cab ot ’s discovery of Newfoundland.

The Supreme Court has

expressed the conclusion that since the United States had acquired all
rights formerly possessed by Great Britain,

it had acquired exclusive

title to all Indian lands.
An express acknowledgment and explanation of the rule of the dis
coverer is contained in Johnson v. M ’lntosh^, in which the court limited

316 Tenn.

256 (1835).

^Price, American I ndi an, pp.
^Johnson v. M ’In t o s h , 21 U.S.
£
Notes,

377-78, citing State v. Forem an.
(8 Wheat)

543, at 587.

"Systematic Discrimination," p. 1305,

M ’Into sh.
^See n. 5 s u pr a.

citing Johnson v .
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the power of the tribes to grant land owned under valid agreements made
by authoritative representatives of the tribes.

Chief Justice Marshall

stated that title to any land depends entirely on the law of the nation
of which the lands are a part.

The principle which the United States

operated upon was the right of the discoverer, impairing the rights of
the tribes to dispose of land independently.

8

. . .[D]iscovery gave an exclusive right to extinguish
the Indian title of occupancy, either by purchase or by
conquest; and gave also a right to such a degree of sov
ereignty, as the circumstances of the people would al 
low them to exercise.
. . .It is not for the Courts of this country to ques
tion the validity of this title [obtained by co nquest],
or to sustain one which is incompatible with it.^
Marshall concludes that however morally objectionable it may a p 
pear to deny to the tribes, whose title by occupancy is valid,

the right

to dispose of the land as they see fit, it is an "indispensable" m e a 
sure supported by reason and cannot be rejected by the courts.

By

denying to the tribes the right to dispose of their land, Johnson v .
M*Intosh preserved in the Federal government a means of controlling
white intervention in the affairs of Indians and established federalist
philosophy in the ascendency by denying to states and individuals the
right to deal with the Indians.

8

Price, American Ind ian , pp.

360-61.

^ lb i d ., p. 363, citing Johnson v. M TIntosh.
lOprice, American I n dia n, p. 366.
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The case arose under two conflicting grants of land made by the
Illinois and Peankeshaw tribes.
dividual

The Indians had sold the land to an in

(Johnson) after which the same land was sold to the United

States by the Treaty of June 7, 1803.
land to M ?Intosh in 1 8 1 8 . ^

The government then granted the

Following the rule of the discoverer,

the

defendant who held title by grant from the United States prevailed over
the plaintiff who derived title from the Indians.
In summary,

12

the United States acquired title to all land by virtue

of its inheritance of sovereignty from Great Britain.

Similarly,

lands

inherited by treaty or conquest from any other sovereign would become
property of the United States.

Tribal inhabitants had the right of occu

pancy only and were prevented from selling tribal lands without the prior
approval of the United States.

Accordingly, under international law, the

United States was free to dispose of the property in any way it saw fit,
regardless of humanitarian motives or treaties.
Natural Law and Puritan Ethic
The influence of morality on the question of acquisition of title
was contributed by the religious philosophy of the colonists.

Although

the philosophy was not free from challenge, its fundamental perception
of law as a reflection of divine will influenced official government at
titudes toward Indian property rights.

■^Cohen, "Original Indian Title," in Legal Conscience, p. 292.
■^Price, American Indian, p. 365.
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The legally acceptable, though sterile attitude of the rule of
the discoverer was expressed by John Winthrop,

leader of the Massachu

setts Bay colony, who justified taking of Indian property on the basis
of two principles.

First, American land was an "undomesticated void"

and the Indians owned it only by a natural right.

Second,

the revealed

word of God in the Bible ordaining that "man occupy the earth, increase
and multiply" created a civil right to land, which superseded the natural
right.

In W i n t h r o p fs rationale, both natural and civil rights to prop

erty are God-given; however, occupancy and labor on land convert it
from common to private property.
land,

Private property,

a civil right to

takes precedence over the natural right of a primitive society.

Therefore,

13

colonists had a legal right verified by divine law to claim

title to lands which they could occupy and work despite claims of tribes.
In December, 1632, Roger Williams challenged Winthrop's reasoning.
He asserted that since tribes themselves recognized their personal owner
ship of land until an actual sale was negotiated and compensation paid,
the land being occupied by tribes until that time, the usurpation of a
government was not valid on the basis of W in thr op1s definition of civil
and natural property r i g h t s . ^

•
^ I b i d . , p. 368, citing C. E. Eisenger, The P u rit an1s Justification
for Taking the L a n d , 84 Essex Institute Historical Collections 131, 135—
143

(1948).
^ I b i d ., pp.

368-69.
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W i n t h r o p Ts rebuttal to Williams consisted of an assertion of di
vine wisdom to which no further challenge could be made:
. . .[I]f God were not pleased with our inheritinge these
partes, whey did he drive out the natives before us? . . .
[W]hy doth he still make room for us, by diminishinge them
as we increase? . . . If we had no right to it, and if he
be pleased to give it us ♦ . . who shall control him or
his terms?
Despite the religious disagreement,

it is significant that the Puri

tans developed a policy justifying taking of land in terms of a religious
ethic.

Their sense of moral integrity was gratified and a pragmatic jus-

tification created to attract new settlers to their colonies.

16

In addi

tion, the factional arguments expressed a need to compensate tribes for
taking their land and built a foundation for good faith negotiations and
honorable management of Indian relations
The Supreme Court on Acquisition of Title
Although the precedent for compensation to tribes was not a legal
standard,

it was supported by government officials and the Supreme Court

in dicta.

Thomas Jefferson identified a limit on the Federal government

in its Indian relations by specifying that its right to take Indian land
was strictly limited by the tribe's willingness to sell.

Washington's

~^ I b i d ., p . 370.
16Ibid.
17The southern colonies, however, generally justified taking of
land by denying the humanity of the Indians.
Price, American I nd ia n,
p. 370, citing G. Nash, "The Image of the Indian in the Southern Colonial
Mind," 14 (unpublished 1971).
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Secretary of War, Henry Knox, whose Department originally managed In
dian affairs,

also recognized the limitation of voluntarism and of ob18

ligatory compensation.
On the part of the Supreme Court, while Johnson v. M*Intosh enun
ciated the principle of the right of the discoverer, Worcester v. Georgia
in dicta contended that if the line of ownership was traced back to Bri
t a i n ’s acquisition,

it would be found that the land had been purchased

from the Indians and that no coercion had been present.

Therefore,

un

der W o r c e s t e r , only that property passed to the United States which had
been purchased by Britain from the Indian tribes.

Further, since Britain

had not had the power of coercion, neither had its descendent in sover
eignty.

Since prior to discovery and purchase by Britain, title had

rested in the Indian tribes,

it could be acquired only by voluntary trans-

19
act ion s.
J
Had the Court held consistently to the extension of the rule of the
discoverer to include compensation, management of title acquisition
would have been greatly simplified.
responsibility in this regard,

However, due to the Congressional

the Court maintained a two-faced approach

by also holding to its original position that conquest alone was a valid

18

Notes, "Systematic Discrimination," p. 1304.

19Price, American Indian, pp. 494-95,
31 U.S.

(6 Pet.) 483

(1832).

citing Worcester v. Geor gi a,
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means of acquiring title.

Finally, although in Beecher v. Wetherby

20

the Court stipulated a line of jurisdiction in acquiring title, i.e.
the Federal government acquires land and states acquire title from the
Federal government,

it also stated that it could not consider whether

Congress’ authorization of any means to acquire title was actually valid.
It could not do so because it had no jurisdiction to consider political
questions,

and in the opinion of the court, extinguishment of Indian

title was a political question.

21

An explanation of the Court’s motivation in relying on the poli
tical question doctrine was expressed in 1835 by Chief Justice Catron:
[W]e should look well to our powers, and the probability
of submission to our judgments, lest the authority of
the judiciary be weakened by successful resistance, . . . .
The Court had grounds to fear rejection of its decisions and consequent
failure of the system of judicial review since it had already dealt with
the stubborn resistance of Georgia and the Presidency in Cherokee Nation
v. Georgia

(1831) and Worcester v. Georgia (1832).

The Court therefore offered three standards to provide for valid
acquisition of title:
compensation,
and

(1) the rule of the discoverer extended to require

(2) acquisition of title without compensation by conquest,

(3) the nonjusticiability of the matter as a political question.

2095 U.S.

517

(1877).

^ I b i d . , at 525.
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Price,

(1835).

American Indian, p. 378, citing State v. For ema n, 16 Tenn.
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The philosophy of the Court obviously expressed confusing stan
dards.

Although pursuant to the rule of the discoverer and the contribu

tion of the Puritan ethic, a generalized attitude toward the conduct
of Indian relations had been established,

only when Congress had assumed

its responsibility by delineating the methods of management of Indian
affairs and was challenged in actual operation could the Court clarify
its position.

It is therefore necessary to look further into particular

cases of a later date which place before the Court justiciable questions
based on Congressional action.

CHAPTER XII
CONGRESSIONAL MANAGEMENT OF INDIAN RELATIONS
Introduction
Since Congress was the principal body responsible for the conduct
of Indian relations,

the Federal protection of Indians was accomplished

largely through legislation.

This chapter will discuss the actions of

Congress in carrying out its responsibility and the resulting questions
brought before the Supreme Court.

The discussion involves consideration

of the Trade and Intercourse Acts,

the end of treaty-making and special

jurisdictional acts granting the Court the authority to decide cases of
Indian claims.
The Trade and Intercourse Acts
The first measures taken bv_-Congress attempted to provide an equi
table system to manage criminal activity between Indians and whites, and
were intended to enforce and honor treaty stipulations negotiated with
the Indian tribes.

.Collectively referred to as the Trade and Intercourse

Acts, the six statutes"*” were actually an attempt to control white aggres
sion against the Indians by equating crimes against any Indian or his
property with the same crime against a white.^

"^Acts of 1790,

1793, 1796, 1799, 1802 and 1834.

9

•

Francis Paul Prucha, American Indian Policy in the Formative Years:
The Indian Trade and Intercourse Acts 1790-1834 (Cambridge, Massachusetts:
Harvard University Press,

1962), p. 190,
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The first Trade and Intercourse Act of July 22, 1790 established
treaty making as the means to conduct Congressional responsibility of
Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution.

The Act stipulated:

Sec. 4.
And be it enacted and declared, That no sale of
lands made by any Indians, or any nation or tribe of In
dians within the United States, shall be valid to any per
son or persons, or to any state, whether having the right
of preemption to such lands or not, unless the same shall
be made and duly executed at some public treaty, held un
der the authority of the United States.^
This statement reflected the Proclamation of the Continental Congress of
September 22, 1783 prohibiting whites "purchasing or receiving any gift
or cession of . . . land or claims without the express authority and di
rections of the United States

. . . .

and restated the Court's asser

tion of federal supremacy in treaty making based on Article VI, Section 2
of

the Constitution including treaties in the supreme law of the land.

It

is also significant for its underlying assumption that the purpose of

treaties was to effectuate the purchase of lands rather than acquisition
without compensation.
Having established the basic procedure to be followed, Congress pur
sued a detailed regulation of contracts between tribes and whites.

The^.

■^Francis Paul Prucha, ed. , Documents of United States Indian Policy
(Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1975), p. 15, citing
Trade and Intercourse Act, July 22, 1790, U. S. Statutes at Large, 1:137-38.
^I b i d ., p. 3, citing Journals of the Continental Congress,

25:602.
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general provisions of the Trade and In£-e~r-€Q-ur-s-e---A.C-ts establ ished specific
t

fines and licensing requirements for purchase of property and trade with
the Indians.

In addition,

any purchases were to be reported to the Fed-

eral government under penalty of a f ine

one-half of which was given to

the government and the other half to the informer responsible for a conviction.

Provisions guaranteeing satisfaction for theft had been written

into some treaties and, if the person responsible could not satisfy the
guaranty,

the United States government was obligated to do so.^

The 1796 Act introduced a provision requiring the death penalty for
£
anyone murdering an Indian in Indian territory
sible,

and if this were not pos

the United States paid the Indian ’s family $100 to $200 as compen

sation.^

If property of an Indian was taken or destroyed,

the responsible

party upon conviction was required to reimburse the Indian twice the value
of the property.

Again,

if he could not do so, the United States Government

was obligated to pay it provided the Indian and his tribe did not seek personal revenge or satisfaction.

8

The punishment of Indian crimes against whites followed a specific
procedure.

Whites were to report to agents,

the agents applied to the

tribe for satisfaction and, absent such satisfaction,
authorized to act.

In matters concerning property,

the President was

a sum could be deducted

from any annuity due the Indians only if the whites sought no private satis-

^Prucha,

Indian P ol ic y, p. 207.

7I b i d ., p. 202.

8I b i d ., p. 192.
-8I b i d ,, p. 192.
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faction.

9

Treaties requiring certain payments to tribes could thereby

by modified by C o n g r e s s . ^
The final Trade and Intercourse Act of June 30, 1834 restated the
basic provisions of its predecessors.

The traditional policy of acquir

ing Indian lands by treaty was not modified but penalties were increased
for violation of the property and trade restrictions.

In addition, penal

ties set originally in 1800 to deter British and Spanish incitement of
the Indians against the United States and forbidding communication with
tribes with the intent to incite violation of treaties were reinstated,
as was the prohibition against inducment of a foreign nation to incite
the Indians to revolt.

11

The indemnification of each race against the other for theft or da
mage to property was also reinstated in the 1834 Act, having elapsed in 1802,

9I bi d., p. 193.
-^The United States
the Indian tribes in the
jurisdiction over Indian
diction from intratribal
Indian P o l i c y , p. 211.

formally recognized the limited sovereignty of
Act of March 3, 1817 which established Federal
offenses but specifically exempted that juris
and intertribal disputes and offenses.
Prucha,
However:

"After the Mexican war several treaties abandoned the longestablished distinction between internal and external affairs,
and certain internal affairs were declared subject to federal
control.
In the act of March 3, 1885, certain specific crimes
(notably murder, manslaughter, rape, assault with intent to
kill, arson, burglury and larsony) were brought under federal
jurisdiction.
Cohen, Federal Indian Law, p. 46, 362-63."
Prucha, Indian P o l i c y , p. 212, n. 46.

11

Prucha,

Indian P o l i c y , p. 264,

citing U. S. S t a t . , II, 6-7.
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in hopes of forestalling attempts at private satisfaction.

Proponents

of the passage of this provision were motivated by hopes of "patient
submission" of both races to the laws of the Federal government.
When persons are injured by the aggression of Indians, and
can look confidently to the government for compensation,
they feel disposed to submit patiently, and to await the
operation of the laws.-^
No absolute guaranty was made to preserve grants of land to tribes
made by treaty, purchase or other agreement w ith the United States, but
the 1834 Act restated the prohibition against settlement on or survey of
those lands and increased the penalty for violation of that prohibition.
In addition, whites were prohibited from destroying any game on the lands
except for subsistence at the risk of forfeiture thereof and a fine.
Whites were also fined for grazing livestock on Indian lands without the
tribe's or individual's consent and government agents were authorized to
remove "squatters".

In the event the agents were unsuccessful, the Presi-

dent could authorize the use of military force to accomplish the removal.
The Act of 1834 introduced one complete reversal of policy.
viously,
disputes.

13

Pre

the War Department had refrained from interference in intertribal
Here the government committed itself to the opposite policy in

order to protect American citizens and to preserve tribal integrity.

P r o

ponents argued that there was a paternal relationship between the Government

■^ Ib id. , p. 265,
•^Prucha,

citing proponents of passage of Act of 1834.

Indian Policy, pp. 263-64.
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and the Indians;

therefore, a paternal duty rested with the Government

to end "ceaseless" and "causeless" Indian wars which were a violation
of justice and humanitarianism.

"It remains for the Government of the

United States alone to determine when they shall end."

In final form,

the Act granted to the War Department general authority to use military
force, under Presidential direction, to end or prevent Indian w a r s .^
The House Committee on Indian Affairs supported the passage of an
additional bill in 1834 which would establish boundaries for an Indian
territory west of Arkansas and Missouri to be reserved perpetually for
the Indian tribes.

Under the proposal,

a system of government was to

be established among the Indians, each tribe maintaining its independent
government for the management of internal affairs and a voluntary tribal
confederacy being managed by representatives from each tribe forming a
council.

A governor was to be appointed by the President with executive

veto power, power of reprieve and authority to settle disputes, execute
the laws and employ military force.

The confederation was to be repre

sented in Congress by one delegate and it was hoped that the territory

■^Prucha, Indian P o l i c y , pp. 266-67.
At the time this provision
was being debated on the floor of Congress, war had broken out between
the Sacs and Foxes and the Sioux.
In response to a plea by William B.
Astor, President of the American Fur Company, Secretary of War Cass de
manded the surrender of both sides and their confinement at military
posts at the risk of the government's taking of hostages or use of m ili
tary force.
His actions were based upon treaties made with these tribes.
Prucha,

Indian P o l i c y , p. 276.
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would eventually be admitted to statehood.
Objections to the proposal were chiefly that it was unconstitu
tional since it granted dictatorial powers to the President and that it
would have a deleterious effect on treaty-making.
of the bill was postponed.

In 1834,

consideration

Although reconsidered late in the session,

it was again postponed and never r e c o n s i d e r e d . ^
The laws passed in 1834 achieved a reorganization of the Indian
Department, creating a legal basis of the Indian service, reinstated
the guidelines for regulating contacts between Indians and whites and
granted approval to the policy of Indian removal to the West.

However,

they did not guaranty the integrity of lands granted to tribes, maintain
ing only a shallow pledge of the United States to do s o . ^
In actual effect,

the Acts of 1834 changed little.

Protection of

Indian rights remained an ideal largely due to the simultaneous growth
of the westward movement and a reduction in military forces intended to
protect the tribes by nearly half,

from 10,000 to 6,000.

Indian a g e n t s ,

though now organized and often effective, had no real power of enforcement.

~ ^ I b i d . , p. 272.
■^The idea had originally been considered in the 1 8 2 0 ’s when the
policy of Indian removal was accepted and had been recommended in trea
ties made as early as 1778 (Treaties with Cherokees, May 6, 1828; Choc
taws, September 27, 1830; Creeks, March 24, 1832).
The annual report of
the Secretary of War in 1836 stressed the need for some such system.
Al
though legislation had been previously introduced to the same end in
1825, 1826 and 1827, it was consistently defeated.
Prucha, Indian P o l i c y ,
pp.

270-74.

~^Ibid. , pp. 273-74,
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Courts and juries were frontier-oriented and strongly prejudiced against
both the Indians and the military who acted as a buffer between the two
groups.

The Indian Department was forced to operate under strict budget

limitations, and a consequent reduction in personnel and restriction of
operations.

18

Simultaneously, the government was flooded with claims

against the Indians "on the least provocation and without clear evidence",
and the licensing provisions of the Acts yielded no convictions,
tively cancelling out the laws.

effec-

19

The effect of these early Acts was to guaranty compensation for
loss of property or life and to make the Federal government ultimately
responsible for payment.

The authority of the United States was there-

fore b ehind ..each.-±.re-aty-.--an.d---statute_p_ur^ Ujanj; _La_i.he custodial function
of Congress.

However,

it had become necessary to reinstate the provi

sions frequently in an effort to organize and control the increasing in
cidents _of-.crimes_j3ej^ween_JIndians and whites.

The success of the treaty-

making system had been intended to be guaranteed by the Acts, but the
needs of the growing frontier movement for land and free a ccess__tp.— landcreated instead a call for the end of treaty making w i th the Indian tribes
The End of Treaty Making
In the mid-Nineteenth Century, a subject of great controversy in
Congress was the apparent ^failure of the Trade and Intercourse Acts to

^ I b i d . , pp. 275-76,
^ I b i d . , pp. 205-07,
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provide peaceful settlement of the land.

Since the Senate maintained

its authority to approve such treaties with the President, Congress'
opposition to treaty making was not, on the surface at least, based on
jealousy of its Constitutional grants of responsibility for the manage
ment of Indian affairs.
that

The fundamental argument made in the House was

(1) Indians can transfer title only to the United States,

(2) treaty

making cannot be used to relinquish land properly belonging to the United
States,

and (3) such use of treaty making is inherently capable of trans-

.
20
ferring United States control of l ands„.,int-0— Q-t-he^--h-and-s-:-

Dissatisfaction with the use of treaties for the conduct of Indian
relations grew in other arenas as well,
self an Indian,

Indian Commissioner Parker, him

expressed his support for abolition of treaty making in

his annual report of 1869.
A treaty involves the idea of a compact between two or more
sovereign powers, each possessing sufficient authority and
force to compel a compliance with the obligations incurred.
The Indian tribes of the United States are not sovereign
nations, capable of making treaties, as none of them have
an organized government of such inherent strength as would
secure a faithful obedience of its people in the observance
of compacts of this character . . . .
[G]reat injury has been
done by the government in deluding this people into the belief
of their being independent sovereignties, while they were at
the same time recognized only as its dependents and wards.

^Prucha,

Documents, pp.

115-16,

citing House Debate between Con

gressman Sidney Clarke of Kansas and Clenni W. Scofield of Pennsylvania
on June 18, 1868.
ib id., pp. 134-35, citing Annual Report of the Commissioner of
Indian Affairs, December 23, 1869 (House Executive Documents no. 1, 41st
Cong.,

2d s e s s ., serial 1414, p. 448).
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In 1871,

Congress considered the matter of ending treaty making,

In its report on the Organization of the Indian Territory..*

22

the Con

g ress. xestated its right to determine the status of Indians and the
nature of any form of government established among them.

Second,

Con

gress referred to its authority to manage Indian affairs in any way it
saw f i t, including termination of treaty making.
which does does not encourage

Third,

[private proprietorship]

"any system

is bad, and any

~
23~
which actually prohibits it will not long be tolerated."
Although
private proprietorship had not been encouraged by laws and treaties
had,

(it

in fact, been ignored, making numerous inalienable grants of land

to t ribes), Congress here specifically rejected the idea that it could
not require allotment of the lands to private persons, stating "Is it to
be wondered at that under these conditions these people make slow advance9/

ment in civilization?"
While the Report acquiesced that previous grants of land were legi
timate and necessary,

it emphasized that land held in common should be

sold for the benefit of the tribes and reminded the government that Indian title to land was not absolute.

25

The Report concluded in an emo

tional argument that the tribes will acquire a "magnificent fund" for
their benefit,

that in the absence of legislation ending treaty making

22Report No.
23

336, 41st Cong.,

3d Sess.

(1871),

3-4, 8-ll.

Price, American India n, pp. 430-31, citing Report No.

24I b id «, p. 434.

25I b i d .

336, s u p r a .
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"a land monopoly so monstrous" would be maintained and that:
The fundamental idea upon which our cosmopolitan republic
rests is opposed to the encouragement or perpetuation of
distinctive national characteristics and sentiments in our
m i d s t .26
On these grounds,

treaty making as a means to conduct Indian af

fairs was ended on March 3. 1871 bv a simple provision in an appropriations bill stating t ha t hence£nr^h-~no^Indian tribe wou 1d^-e— 3^k-n'Qwle.d-ged.
as independent and capable of contracting with the United States to nego
tiate treaties.

However,

treaties made prior to that date would retain__.

their validity and both the United States and the tribes were to be
bound by obligations placed on them pursuant to those agreements.
By the 1880's,
the public;

Congressional attitudes were commonly accepted by

tribes were no longer seen as sovereign nations capable of

treaty making, but as organizations holding a monopoly on vast tracts
of land who would be benefitted by allotment of lands and instruction
in the tradition of private proprietorship.

Their incorporation into

the main culture of the country would thereby be assured.

The General

Allotment Act of February 8, 1887 authorized the President to divide
tribal lands into 160 acre plots and grant them to individual tribal

^ I b i d . Alternatively, the idea of exclusive tribal ownership,
i.e. land held in common, was well established since each group recog
nized its own territory, including specific limits essential for the
preservation of its m e m b e r s ’ lives.
Cohen, "Indian Claims," Legal
Con sc ien ce, pp. 267-68.
97

Prucha, Docu me nts , p. 136, citing U. S, Statutes at Large, 16:566.
See, however, the discussion of Lone Wolf v. Hi tch c o c k , p. 22, s u p r a .

members whenever he felt it best for agricultural or grazing purposes,

2ft

and was supplemented by the Curtis Act of June 28, 1898, accomplishing
the final allotment of lands which had been exempted from the Dawes Act.
Congress pursued its policy of division and assignment of tribal lands
until 1934 with the passage of the Wheeler-Howard Act, reversing the
policy of allotment and encouraging tribal organization.

29

Throughout

the preceding 47 year period, Congress had justified its policy on grounds
of a legal responsibility to ensure that all members of tribes shared as
equal beneficiaries of the assets of the tribe,

30

and on the grounds that,

since it was impossible to obtain agreements with the tribes to accomplish
what was in its best interest,

it was the obligation of Congress to do so.

Thus, while Johnson v. M*Intosh provided the constitutional frame
work for federal control of Indian lands, the Trade and Intercourse Acts,
Dawes Act and Curtis Act represent the statutory framework by which Indian
property was controlled and title distributed from the Federal government
to white settlers.
Special Jurisdictional Acts
Since the general constitutional grant of authority to Congress to

^Price,
^Prucha,

American I n d ian , p. 444,

citing 25 U.S.C.

§331.

D o cu men ts , p. 222.

Price, American I n d i a n , pp. 444-45, citing Senate Comm. Report
No.

377, May 7, 1894, 53d Cong., 2d Sess., Vol. 5.

31I b i d ., p. 446, citing Extracts from House Comm. Report, March 1,
1898, accompanying the Curtis Bill (House Rep. No. 593, 55th Cong. 2d Sess
Vol.

3).

48
deal with Indian tribes was consistently upheld by the Supreme Court,
no effective means for the registry of Indian claims could be made w i t h 
out the acquiescence of Congress.

Although the early Trade and Inter

course Acts had provided a system for settlement of claims between In
dians and whites for personal property grievances by lower courts,

suits

by Indians against the United States for violation of the terms of a
treaty were limited by the Act of March 3, 1863.

The Act prohibited

the consideration of claims arising out of any treaty with foreign na
tions or Indian tribes and made it necessary for such claimants to ob
tain special jurisdictional acts for hearing each alleged violation.
Since these jurisdictional acts varied in content,

the determination,of

a particular claim depended on judicial interpretation of each specific
a ct .32
33
Northwestern Bands of Shoshone Indians v. United S t a t e s ,
is an
example of the Court's dependence on such a special jurisdictional act.
The suit against the United States asserted that title to Indian land
had been unlawfully cancelled in violation of the Box Elder Treaty grant
ing the land to the tribe.

The jurisdictional act of 1929 authorizing

hearing of the case specified that a claim which was based only on the
terms of that treaty could be heard.
recognized the Indian title,

32

Since the treaty had not specifically

the Court could not assume that Indian title

Price, American I n d i a n , p, 458.

33324 U.S.

335

(1945).
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was valid and therefore rejected the trib e’s claim.
opinion,

In a concurring

the Court identified only a moral obligation, not a legal re

sponsibility,

of the United States in this instance.

We can make only a pretense of adjudication of such claims,
and that only by indulging the most unrealistic and fic
tional assumptions.
Justice Jackson, concurring.
The "unrealistic assumptions" would result from a lack of written evidence
presented by the tribe, the necessity of relying on indirect testimony,
and the inapplicability of a court hearing where legal documents had
been executed after conquest.

34

Echoing the words of Indian Commissioner Parker in his annual re
port of 1869, Justice Jackson continued:
The most elemental condition of a bargain was not present,
for there was nothing like equality of bargaining power. . .
Here we are asked to decide whether their [the Ind ian s’] in
tent was to relinquish titles or make reservations of titles
or recognition of titles.
The Indian parties did not know
what titles were, had no such concept as that of individual
land title, and had no sense of property in land . . . Acqui
sitiveness, which develops a law of real property,
complishment only of the ’civi liz ed ’.

is an ac

The treaty was a political document.
It was intended to pacify
the
Indians
and
to
let
the
whites
travel
in. peace a route
they
----------■------ ■
■
■■
■ - .i
i
i
—
------:
*—
somehow were going to travel a n y w a y . [Emphasis added.]
While the C o u r t ’s majority decision denied relief because the jurisdictional
act granted no grounds for claims on unrecognized title as in the Treaty of

* \f

Price, American India n, pp. 459-61.
35

I bid. , pp.

461-62, citing concurring opinion of Justice Jackson in

N. W. Shoshone v. U. S.
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July 30, 1863,

its opinion also reflected a strong sense that no tri

bal claims to title were valid.

The cession of land by defeat in war

was sufficient to validate United States title without further agreement.
Therefore,

the responsibility of the Court was to render a simple deci

sion based on the instructions given by the Congress.

Legal claims

were really not considered, only compliance with Congressional direc
tives .
A strong dissenting opinion written by Justice Douglas was highly
praised by the general public as reflecting the true spirit of United
States-Indian agreements.

His position was based on the premise that

since the jurisdictional act had allowed claims pursuant to the treaty
and since a treaty is a legal document between consenting parties,

the

United States was obligated to recognize legitimate title of the Shoshones.
Though the Box Elder Treaty did not specifically state that title was
vested in the tribe,

the very act of negotiation presumed a recognition

on the part of the United States that the tribe held title to the land.
It was stated in Worcester v. Georgia . , . that ’The ac
ceptance of these cessions is an acknowledgment of the
right of the Cherokees to make or withhold t h e m . ’ That is
good law.
It is as applicable here as it was in that early
case.

O£
Ibid., p. 463, citing dissenting opinion of Justice Douglas in
N. W. Band of Shoshones v. U. S . Felix Cohen referred to the grounds of
the C o u r t ’s majority opinion as a myth, stating that the absence of tri
bal identities was a fallacy, and that if nomadic existence cancels title
those white persons then in possession of the land also had invalid title
since the land was used only for seasonal grazing.
Price, American Indian, p. 464.
Also note P r i c e ’s description of the events following
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Due to the rigid interpretation of the special jurisdictional act,
the Shoshone tribe was unable to gain acknowledgment of their ownership
of the land.

Such rigidity, however,

fulfilled the instructions of Con

gress, which had primary authority in Indian relations.
a favorably worded jurisdictional act from Congress,
grounds to accept the Indian position.

Therefore,

given

the Court would have

Such was the case in United States

37
v. Alcea Band of Til la moo ks,
an example of the successful use of a spe
cial jurisdictional act to sue the Federal government.

Chief Justice

Vinson accepted the tribe's position because the jurisdictional act al
lowed "any and all legal and equitable claims arising under or growing
out of the original Indian title,

claim, or rights in . . . the lands

. . .

OO
occupied by the Indian tribes and bands

. . . ."

The tribe therefore

could obtain compensation because of a violation of their right of occu
pancy.

The Court stipulated that while Congress may extinguish title based

the Court's decision on March 12, 1945:
". . . requests for a rehearing of the case were filed by
the Senate and House Committee on Indian Affairs, the Attor
ney General of the State of Utah, the Attorney General of
the State of Idaho, Judge Manley 0. Hudson of the Permanent
Court of International Justice, the Department of the Inter
ior, the National Congress of American Indians, and the Ameri
can Civil Liberties Union.
Editorial comment on the opinion,
uniformly unfavorable, appeared in many periodicals through
the country.
The request for rehearing was denied without
opinion.
The original opinion of the Court was a 5 to 4 deci
sion from which Justices Roberts, Frankfurther, Douglas and
Murphy dissented."

I b i d . , p. 463, n. 1.

37329 U.S. 40 (1946).

38

Price, American I n d i a n , p. 465.
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on a right of occupancy,
so taken.

it is under an obligation to pay for the land

Justice Black concurred in this decision but pointed out

that Congress had, by the express terms of the jurisdictional act,
created a ground for compensation which had not previously existed.
Unlike the Shoshone decision,

39

in Alcea an Indian tribe successfully

sued the Federal government because the jurisdictional act had speci
fically mentioned "original Indian t i t l e " . ^
From the end of treaty making in 1871 to the establishment of the
Indian Claims Commission in 1946, the Supreme Court was severely limited
by the disposition of Congress.

Its reliance on special jurisdictional

acts had resulted in narrow interpretations of Indian claims, more fre
quently against the interest of the tribes than in their favor.
1881 and 1946,

Between

142 claims were l i t i g a t e d , ^ and of those heard by 1940,

only 26% had awarded recoveries to Indians.

/0

The determining factor in successful suits against the United States
was the issue of Indian title to the land, how it was acquired and how it
I
was terminated.
vide

The period of use

of special jurisdictional acts did

an opportunity to resolve the issue.

^^I b i d ., pp.

Congressional

pro

management of

465-66.

^ I n 1951, the Court considered a suit by the Alcea Band for inter
est due from the time of taking the land on the compensation awarded in
the 1946 case.

The Court denied their petition.

^Price,

American I nd i a n , p.

458.

^Cohen,

"Indian Claims," in

Legal Conscience, pp.

270-71.
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Indian lands was restricted and the following section discusses the ra
tionale of the Court in doing so.
The Court Against Congress
Several cases exemplify the activities of the Government during
the years of the final frontier movement.

Since Congress had pledged

the good faith of the United States to honor treaties made before 1871,
much of the litigation revolved around the negligence of the government
in violating treaties.

While the Court proclaimed that neither Congress

nor administrative departments could ignore property rights vested by
treaty,4^ it also proclaimed that property rights were protected even
in the absence of recognized title by treaty, act of Congress or Execu
tive Order where
pany.

Congress had authorized a sale of land

The Court had consistently

to a private

com

held that lands could be managed only

by the Federal government.
The case at issue,

Cramer v. U. S. ,^4 was one of many involving the

development of a national railway system, an essential element in the settle
ment of the West.

Cramer involved the issue of patents which had been made

to the Central Pacific Railroad Company under a land grant of July 25, 1866
authorizing the sale of lands to private individuals.

The grant was chal

lenged on the basis that the lands sold by the railroad had been reserved
to the Indians.

The Court reiterated its fundamental principles in questions

4 ~^Jones v.

M e e h a n , 175 U.S. 1 (1899),

44261 U.S.

219

(1923).
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of Indian title to and occupancy of land.

First,

their right of occu

pancy can only be interferred with by the Federal government;
individual as well as tribal occupancy is protected.

second,

Since the terri

tories involved were required by statute to "disclaim all right and
title to lands ’owned or held by any Indian or Indian tri b e s . ’ [emphasis
supplied.]"

45

in order to acquire statehood, the Indian lands were still

clearly part of the Federal trust.

Finally, Cramer held that denying

individual possessory rights would be contrary to the federal policy of
encouraging settlement and acculturation of the Indian and the patent
was found invalid.

Since the suit was based on statutory authority and

not on a constitutional question,

the Court could deny Congress the power

to terminate Indian title by virtue of the Indian right of occupancy.

46

In a highly sensitive case in 1925, U. S., as Guardian of Hualapai
Indians v. Santa Fe Pacific R ai l w a y , the question arose as to the right
of Congress to authorize an exchange between a railway and the Indian
tribe of lands which had never been ceded to the United States by treaty,
purchase or conquest.

47

In 1866,

Congress passed an act granting the odd-

numbered sections of land in question to the railway, and authorized the

Cohen,

"Original Indian Title," in Legal Conscience, pp.

275-76.

^ I bid. , pp. 274-76.
47The Attorney General of t he United States had refused to argue the
case on behalf of the Indians for fear that the results might impose a tre
mendous liability on the government.
In his absence, the case was pleaded
by the Solicitor for the Department of the Interior.
I b i d ., p. 278.

55
Secretary of the Interior to negotiate an exchange of land between the
railway and the tribe to facilitate property boundaries.

The Secretary

of the Interior took action to patent one-half of the Hualapai Reserva
tion in Arizona established in 1883 to the Santa Fe Pacific Railway.
The tribe argued that it had a possessory right to all of the land
based on aboriginal title and that the railway could not "exchange" land
it did not own.

The C o u r t ’s decision was unanimous in favor of the tribe,

stipulating that occupancy established valid property rights even in the
absence of treaty or statutory support of title and that this right was
enforceable against non-Indian grantees.

Had there been a previous land

cession through some agreement to the United States, the exchange of land
authorized by Congress would have been valid.

48

Cramer and Hualapai express the legal position that Indian lands
are protected by Federal guaranties and that in the absence of a valid,
overriding statute,

such guaranties are absolute.

A statute could be

invalidated if it violated the Federal obligation to protect Indian lands
from state or individual encroachment.
It is of extreme importance that one remember, however, that although
tribal lands were protected from invalid Congressional statute and transfer
to private citizens without prior acquisition through the Federal govern
ment,

the Court still recognized the plenary authority of Congress to

^ T h e conflict was resolved by the entry of a decree on March 13,
1947 establishing Indian title to 500,000 acres which the Government had
previously promised to the railroad.
Cohen, "Original Indian Title," in
Legal Co n science, pp.

277-79.
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manage Indian lands and to extinguish title on the basis of Article I,
Section

8

of the Constitution.

49

Tribal rights of occupancy were vul

nerable only to the Federal government and the Court could not inquire
into its acquisition of title because it remained a political question.
Justice Douglas expressed a harsh, but explicit summary of the
C o u r t ’s position on political questions in Santa Fe Pacific Railway in
relation to extinguishment of title:
And whether it be done by treaty, by the sword, by pur
chase, by the exercise of complete domination adverse to
the right of occupancy or otherwise, its justness is not
open to inquiry in the c o u r t s . 50
Nevertheless, where Congress had guaranteed the right of occupancy,

the

Court was free to entertain suits.
The whole history of Indian claims,
sion of treaties and ensuing statutes.

then, revolves around the succes

In many cases, complex renegotia

tions with tribes were attempted to achieve the goal of acquisition of
land and eventual settlement.

Two cases will illustrate the results of

good faith negotiations with the United States by Indian tribes.
In Shoshone Tribe of Indians v. United S t a t e s , t h e

Court validated

the action of the United States in acquiring title to land pursuant to three
treaties with the Shoshone Tribe.

49U.

In its petition, the tribe alleged that

S. v. Santa Fe Pac. R. R . , at 347.

5 0price, American Indian, p. 419,
at 347.
5 1 299 U.S. 476 (1937),

citing U. S. v. Santa Fe Pac.

R. R . ,
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the Treaty of July 3, 1868 had been violated.

The tribe had agreed by

that treaty to relinquish a reservation of 44.7 million acres for one
of 3.1 million acres contingent upon a pledge by the United States that
no person would ever be allowed to cross over or settle upon the land.
The Commissioner of Indian Affairs,
terior,

acting with the Secretary of the In

relocated the Arapahoe tribe on a portion of the 3.1 million acres

pledged to the Shoshone.

While the Shoshones agreed to the temporary pre

sence of the Arapahoe, no action was taken by the government to locate an
alternative permanent settlement for the squatters.
jected to the situation,

When the tribe ob

an agreement was concluded purchasing another

portion of the land and stipulating that the new agreement did not deprive
the Shoshone of annuities or benefits made under prior treaties.
Agreement was ratified by Congress in 1897;
in a third agreement of purchase in 1904.

The

the same procedure was followed

52

The Supreme Court found that the transactions were valid, but that
the amount of compensation had been inadequate since the land had been at
least value at the time of the t a king .33

The Court therefore affirmed a

judgment against the United States in the amount of $4,408,444.23 plus in
terest as compensation for the lands taken without tribal consent by relo
cating another tribe thereon.

33Price,

American In d i a n , pp. 451-53.

5 3Ibid.

"^Cohen,

’’Spanish Origin,” in Legal Conscience, p. 247, n. 51.
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The Court performed honorably in Shoshone by requiring reasonable
compensation for lands validly taken.

However, the allocation of land

and just payment for them was a difficult question and more often than
not C o n g r e s s ’ action was validated even where its purpose and methods
were morally questionable.

Sioux Tribe of Indians v. United States-^

is an interesting example of how the government managed tribal lands
when confronted with the unavoidable intrusion of white settlers.
area involved,

The

the Black Hills, had been part of a Sioux reservation by

an agreement of 1868.

However, with the discovery of gold in 1874, the

"government was faced with a fait accompli which it accepted in violation
of the treaty

[Blumental 128-29]."

Military troops were sent to the area to prevent the incursion of
fortune hunters with the eventual result of war, but following the failure
of C u s t e r ’s Expedition it became obvious that new agreements, had to be
negotiated for the purchase of the Indian lands and their subsequent re
moval ,
In his annual report to Congress in 1875, the Secretary of the In
terior urged that Congress take action to resolve the crisis in the Black
Hills resulting from the inability of the government to settle the dis
putes peacefully.

While the Secretary acknowledged that the land was

held by valid titie in the tribes and that treaties should be generally

5597 Ct. Cl.
-^Notes,

613 (1942).

"Systematic Discrimination," p. 1303.
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inviolate, he urged that Congress take action on the basis of the gratui
tous services provided the tribes by the government.

The obligation was

valued at approximately $1.25 million over a two year period.

He con

cluded :
It is submitted, therefore, under these circumstances, for
the consideration of Congress, whether it would not be jus
tifiable and proper to make future appropriations for sup
plies to this people, contingent on the relinquishment of
the gold field in the Black Hills and the right-of-way
t hereto.^
In December,

1875, the President recommended similar action and cited the
cQ

opinion of the Secretary in his report.
The resulting legislation of August 15, 1876 accepted the Executive
recommendation and appropriated an additional sum of $ 1.0 million per year
for the subsistence and civilization of the Sioux contingent upon their re
linquishment of the lands.

The President appointed a commission to handle

the negotiations for the purchase and, although more than 90% of the tri
bal members rejected the government’s offer (under the Treaty of 1868,
three-fourths assent was required),
and approved on February 28, 1877.

the agreement was submitted to Congress
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In finding against the Sioux Tribe, the Court concluded:
P l a i ntiff’s position in substance is that one party to a pro
posed transaction cannot legally fix the terms or considera
tion and force the other party to accept them.

This is true

^ P r i c e , American I ndian, pp. 437-438.
58lbid.

59I b i d .,

pp. 438-39.
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in transactions between private parties dealing at a r m ’s
length and on terms of equal authority, but this legal
proposition does not follow in dealings between the Gov
ernment and Indian Tribes so as to enable the Indians
to question in a legal proceeding the policy, wisdom,
or authority of Congress, unless Congress has clearly
granted to the Indians the right to do s o ,88
An agreement accepted by only 10% of the tribe was thereby accepted
by the Court as a valid exercise of Congressional authority.

The posi

tion of the Sioux tribe as a whole was not acknowledged; only the action
of Congress was of significance before the Court.
Conclusion
The activities of Congress in managing Indian relations are the
ultimate determining element in how and when title to Indian land is trans
ferred to the United States.

Congress has followed a pattern of estab

lishing methods of title acquisition which would streamline the settle
ment

of the continent and fulfill its obligation to make laws for the w e l 

fare

of the country.

The Trade and Intercourse Acts enunciated federal

supremacy in these matters and guaranteed Federal protection of treaty
rights against state and individual encroachment.

Although attempts

made to recognize the political equality of Indians by incorporating
their tribal system into the republican structure had failed, at least
the precedent for compensation for taking land had been accomplished by
the Acts.

Price, American In d i a n , p. 440, citing Sioux Tribe of Indians
v. United States,
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Settlement of land was of the utmost concern to Congress and the
subsequent end of treaty making in 1871 was merely an acknowledgment of
the fact,

Treaties were defined as political documents whose result

had been to create the ogre of land monopoly and therefore were clearly
unacceptable means of controlling the Federal domain.

With the end of

treaty making, a new policy of division and allotment of tribal lands
was instituted to tranquilize the n a t i o n ’s fear of vast portions of land
impeding the development of the nation.
Although Congress rejected the sovereignty of tribes,
its intention to honor its treaty obligations.

it expressed

To do so, it permitted

requests for special consideration of claims against the United States.
The exact terminology of the special jurisdictional acts was of great
importance to the Supreme Court in determining liability, and since
Congress was responsible for the terminology the C o u r t ’s function was
to dispose of cases according to the intent of Congress.
the language of the acts was general,

Where, however,

the Court was able to maintain the

integrity of treaties and find liability in the government.

Nevertheless,

whatever means Congress used, whether by agreement or by conquest, were
valid,

pursuant to the constitutional grant of authority to the legisla

tive body for the conduct of Indian relations.
The Court was, however,

able to nullify Congressional action which

violated the general legal principles of Indian relations.

Treaty rights

were vulnerable only to the Federal government and could not be infringed
by state or individual actions.

Attempts to simplify the development of
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a transcontinental railway system exemplified the Courtis adherence to
this rule even where the national interest was thereby complicated.
Congress was,

therefore,

obliged to honor its prior agreements with In

dians, but, as the Court expressed in Sioux T r i b e , even the most trans
parent infractions of terms of a treaty were valid if approved by Con
gress .
In sum, Congressional action was supreme and the C o u r t ’s role was
one of balancing treaties against statutes, maintaining only the most
elemental obligations of the government to the Indian tribes.

CHAPTER XV
THE INDIAN CLAIMS COMMISSION
Introduction
Adjudication of Indian property rights had always depended upon
Congress to provide a means of suing the Federal government.

Once the

period of Indian wars came to an end, and the Trade and Intercourse Acts
were no longer relevant,

special jursidictional acts had provided the

means to assert claims against the United States.

As tribes became educated

to the standards of American jurisprudence, the number of claims increased
formidably and Congress sought a means to eliminate the growing demands on
its time for passage of the special jurisdictional acts.

The result of

the discussion was the passage of the Indian Claims Commission Act of
August 13, 1946.^
The establishment of the Commission was the logical result of Ameri
can reliance on the rule of law, a concept inherited from Britain,
increase in the number of claims brought by Indian plaintiffs.

2

and an

The passage

of the Act acknowledged that tribes have a legitimate right to reparation
and that there must be a method of acquiring such reparation.

These con

cepts were new to the theory of compensability of Indian claims, and were
regarded not as legal, but as moral obligations of the government.

"^Act of August 13, 1946, ch. 959, 1, 60 Stat.
U.S.C, ch. 2A (1970)).

1049

3

(Codified at 25

2

Cohen,
3
Notes,
5314

(.1946),

"Indian Claims,",

in Legal Conscience, p. 268.

"Systematic Discrimination,", p. 1307,

citing 90 Cong. Rec.
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This chapter contains a discussion of the new standards for adju
dication provided by the Indian Claims Commission Act of 1946, and the
application of the standards in actual practice of the Commission and
the Court of Claims,

the body of appeal from decisions of the Commission.

Standards
The Commission operates in an adversary manner between the govern
ment and the Indian tribes and renders decisions based on events arising
before 1947.

Decisions may be appealed to the Court of Claims, which

also has direct jurisdiction for actions based on events arising after
4
1946.

The system is based on the principal that compensation should be

provided for lands unfairly or illegally taken even if full restitution
can never be made.

5

Included in the definition of its jurisdiction are claims based
on fraudulent revisions to agreements with the United States, mutual or
unilateral mistakes,

"unconscionable consideration", and "fair and hon o r 

able dealings" not recognized by any law or rule.

While most of these

definitions require interpretation of treaties and other legal documents,
the "fair and honorable dealings" standard is one requiring consideration
of moral or ethical questions.
limited in practice, but,

again,

Its subjective nature has been severely
it is a statutory acknowledgment that

^Sandra C. Danforth, "Repaying Historical Debts: The Indian Claims
Commission," North Dakota Law R e v i e w , Vol. 49, No. 2 (Winter, 1973), p. 390.
^Notes, "Systematic Discrimination," p. 1300, citing W. Blumenthal,
American Indians Dispossessed 22-23 (1955),
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c.

such questions are significant in resolving claim disputes.
The standards of the Indian Claims Commission which expanded the
bases for entry of claims against the United States are,

in summary,

the acknowledgment of a moral obligation of the government to provide
reparation for invalid taking of land, any claim arising out of fraud,
"mistakes",

unreasonable compensation and the absence of good faith

negotiations which are not recognized by any law or rule.
The 1946 Act also provided additional standards to the court of
appeal.

The Court of Claims was granted judicial review to determine

. . . whether the findings of fact of the Commission are
supported by substantial evidence,, in which event they
shall be conclusive, and also whether the conclusions of
law . . . stated by the Commission as a basis for its final
determination, are valid and supported by the Commissioner's
findings of fact.^
The Court of Claims will therefore affirm any action of the Commission
it feels was based upon "substantial evidence" supported by reason,
reverse any decision lacking substantial evidence.

and

The Court is also

free to determine questions of law and may reject the Commission's decision if it is based on a misinterpretation of law.

Q

The "substantial evidence" based on reason rule seems arbitrary
but considering the age of much of the evidence, which may be based only

^Danforth, "Historical Debts," p. 388.
Indeed, the sponsor of
the Act, Henry Jackson, commented that many claims concern strictly
moral obligations.
Notes, "Systematic Discrimination," p. 1307, citing
92 Cong.. Rec. 5314

(1946) .

^Notes, "Systematic Discrimination,", p. 1312, citing 25 U,S,C.
§ 7 0 (s) 1970.
^Notes,

"Systematic Discrimination," pp. 1312-13.
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on tribal custom and oral tradition, great flexibility is allowed in its
interpretation.

For example,

the inaccuracy and inadequacy of accounts

of the geography in question frequently must be considered.

What ma 

terials have been written were generally compiled by non-Indians and
may reflect a prejudice to the government's case.

The odds against a

claimant successfully overcoming the variables of ancient, oral evidence,
9

geographical discrepancies and prejudicial data are considerable.

The

arbitrary standard of "substantial evidence" is, therefore, a realistic
standard and,
Claims,

since appeal may be made from decisions of the Court of

is subject to review by the Supreme Court,

The Indian Claims Commission Act, by acknowledging the obligatory
but difficult nature of Indian claims settlements, did provide expanded
grounds for successful entry of claims against the United States.
of the principles previously assumed, e.g.
are clearly translated into the statute.

All

the lack of accurate evidence,
This statement alone greatly

contributed to the redress of unjust acquisition of land at the expense
of the Indian.
The greatest contribution of the Commission and the Court of Claims
has been to provide equitable compensation for the lands illegally taken.
While the Act requires that the Commission deliver a statement as to w h e 
ther there are just grounds for relief and the amount of relief
and authorizes appropriation of the amounts

9Ibid,, p, 1311.

[§19],

[§22] and manner of distribu-
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tion of amounts,

_

property.

10

it does not rule out settlement by restoration of

11

Given the strong attachment to land which has remained
one of the persistent characteristics of Indian societies,
just compensation would involve return of at least some
of the land which was taken, not a monetary substitute.^
In a few cases before the Commission,

claimants have rejected

monetary awards and insisted upon the return of the land in question.
For example,

the Taos Pueblo were awarded Blue Lake, a portion of the

ancestral lands which had great religious significance to them.

The

land had been part of a national forest preserve and was returned to
them largely through the efforts of the executive branch of government
which pushed through the necessary legislation.

The action was justi1 o

fied as a matter of respect for religious principles

and does not

serve as a reliable standard for all recoveries.
Whatever compensation is requested,

the Indian Claims Commission

Act formally established grounds for recovery based on legal and extralegal questions written in generalized terms.

The effect was to acknow

ledge the justiciability of such indefinite causes

as fraud, misrepresen

tation, unfair or dishonorable dealings and unreasonable compensation.
Such standards are of an arbitrary nature, but under the Act they are
acknowledged as valid components of the Indian claims problems,

in addi

tion to the written evidence of treaties and statutes.

1(^See Federal Register, Vol. 41, No.

97-^Tuesday, May 18, 1976,

p. 20429 for an example.
■^Danforth,
12i _
bJLd.->

’’Historical Debts,” pp.

P- 392.

390-91.
13 ibjd . ? pp>

393- 94 .
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Practice
Although expanded grounds for redress were provided by the Indian
Claims Commission Act,

in actual practice they were somewhat restricted.

Given the possibility of the tremendous monetary obligations which could
be enforced against the United S t a t e s , the Court of Claims and the Su
preme Court, were cautious in interpreting the statutory terms.

In Yakima

14
Tribe v. United St a t e s ,
the claimants were unable to overcome the vari
ables of oral evidence and discrepancies

in ancient descriptions of prop

erty ceded to the United States by treaty.

On first hearing,

the Commis

sion acknowledged that it could not accurately determine the boundaries
under the treaty, and settled upon a boundary line which excluded the
land

claimed by the

Court of Claims

Indians,

thereby denying them

compensation. The

on appeal approved the action of the Commission, finding

that its determination was a reasonable s o l u t i o n . A l t h o u g h

the Court

of Claims acknowledged the thoroughness and reasonableness of the In
dians' argument,

it found that "substantial evidence existed for the

C o m m i s s i o n s finding.
and

[It] had been confronted by an unclear treaty

C o n f l i c t i n g opinion evidence'

rived at a reasonable conclusion."

14158 Ct.

Cl.

672

1 ^177 Ct.

Cl.

184,

16

Notes,

and, according to the court, had ar16

(1962),
205

(1966), Confederated

"Systematic Discrimination," p. 1315,

Tribes v. United S t a t e s .

Here,

then,

the substantial evidence rule worked in favor of the

government rather than the claimants, even though the claimants’ case
was found to be reasonable and supported by detailed and extensive evi
dence .
The Indian Claims Commission Act was further restricted by a deci
sion of the Supreme Court in Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United S t a t e s . ^
Since the Indian Claims Commission Act had allowed claims which were no
based on any law or rule, redress was available for the taking of lands
title to which had never been acknowledged by any treaty or statute.
While tribes had previously been protected in the absence of treaty or
statute

(see previous discussion of Santa Fe Pac. R . R .), the Court in

Tee-Hit-Ton expressed a different principle by finding that only where
title had been specifically acknowledged could the tribes obtain com
pensation for violation of that title.

The Fifth Amendment requires

compensation only for those lands, and to establish a valid claim it
must be shown that there was some definite intention by Congress to ac
knowledge Indian title, whether by treaty,

statute or other action.

The case arose when the Tee-Hit-Ton tribe sought compensation
for timber which had been sold by the Secretary of Agriculture in 1951
from land claimed by the tribe.

The Supreme Court resolved the issue

by restating its principle that Congress is the authoritative body to
determine the extinguishment of title and compensation due.

^ 3 4 8 U.S.

272

(1955),

18

^ P r i c e , American I n d i a n , p. 470.
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. . . Indian occupancy, not specifically recognized as
ownership by action authorized by Congress, may be ex
tinguished by the Government without c o m p e n s a t i o n . ^
Under Tee-Hit-Ton, therefore,

the fart of occupancy of a tribe on

a specific piece of land in the absence of title recognized by Congress
would not serve as a valid basis for the assertion of a claim against
the United States.

However,

in subsequent cases before the Court of

Claims tribes could obtain compensation where title was not recognized
by Congress if they were able to prove their "aboriginal" title to the
lands in question.

Aboriginal title was defined as "actual, exclusive,

and continuous use and occupancy
their land."

’for a long t i m e 1 prior to the loss of

20

Again, the difficulties of proving such ownership by aboriginal
title cannot be ignored, and the substantial evidence rule of the Indian
Claims Commission has been used against the assertion of such a claim.
Aboriginal title to the Iowa Tribe was rejected and compensation denied

21

in Iowa Tribe v. United S t a t e s ,

where the Court justified the findings

of the Commission denying relief by stating:
Where the evidence . . . is neither sharp nor decisive, nor
overwhelmingly one way, the fact-finding tribunal must make
its own judgments and its choices.
We have no option but

■ ^ I b i d . , pp. 467-69, citing Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United St a t e s .

20

Notes, "Systematic Discrimination," p. 1315, citing Sac and Fox
Tribe v. United S tates, 315 F. 2d 396 (Ct. Cl. 1963).
21no.

3-70 (Ct, Cl.. July 14, 1971).
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to conclude that the evidence on which the Commission
relied for its resolution of the factual questions is
substantial . . . . ^
In contrast to John M a r s h a l l ’s insistence upon deciding doubtful
cases in favor of the Indians,

23

the Indian Claims Commission Act's sub

stantial evidence rule tends to be a more precise standard, but simul
taneously decreases the chances of successful Indian recoveries.
can one present substantial evidence to prove "actual,

How

exclusive and

continuous use and occupancy" by a particular tribe in the absence of
written documentation?
Tribes situated to the west of the Great Plains had enjoyed such
aboriginal title since the incursion of settlers came at the end of the

o/
territorial expansion.

In United States v. Northern Paiute N a t i o n ,

aboriginal title was successfully used to acquire compensation for lands
taken by the United States.

The case arose pursuant to a taking in 1860

of land which contained Virginia City, Nevada and the valuable Comstock
Lode.

When members of the Paiute tribe revenged the kidnapping of two

of their members by the settlers,

the Virginia City miners organized

an unsuccessful expedition against the tribe and requested the assistance
of the Army in eventually wiping out the Paiute tribe.

22Notes, "Systematic Discrimination," p. 1316, citing Iowa Tribe
v. United S t a t e s .

^ C h e r o k e e N a t i o n , Worcester v. G e o r g i a , s u p r a .
24393 F.2d 786

(Ct, Cl, 1968).
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In the Court*s opinion,

the tribe had incontestably owned the land

by virtue of aboriginal title, and the United States had clearly taken
the land not by virtue of a treaty or statute, but by virtue of the ac
tion of the U. S. Army,

the refusal of Congress to intervene,

the estab

lishment of a Nevada territorial government and judicial structure,

and

by the determination of the Supreme Court that the miners were more
than trespassers on the land.

25

In Northern P a i u t e , therefore, a series of actions without the
specific intent of Congress to extinguish title amounted to a definite
intent of Congress to take the land against a valid aboriginal title of
the tribe.

Under the terms of this conflict,

the tribe was due compen

sation.
Conclusion
The Indian Claims Commission Act was an attempt to simplify a
claims procedure for the benefit of Indians which had become incapable
of hearing all the claims asserted against the United States without
special jurisdictional acts.

By acknowledging the presence and validity

of such standards as ethical consideration, and fair and honorable deal
ings, the Congress added to the legal dimension new and imprecise stan
dards which were difficult to fulfill but an essential part of United
States-Indian relations.

^ P r i c e , American Indian, pp. 449-50.
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The Court of Claims has narrowed the applicability of such stan
dards by supporting reasonable decisions of the Commission based on
substantial evidence.

A further challenge to the effectiveness of the

Commission is the potential conflict of interest which the government
may find in attempting to preserve its responsibility to the tribes
under the act while increasing its responsibility to manage public re26
sources.
In the absence of extensive written evidence,

the general standards

under the Act of "unconscionable consideration" and "fair and honorable"
dealings demand evidence of gross misconduct in the management of Indian
affairs.

27

Since the standards are so broad they may result in inconsis

tent determination.

Further,

the Act's provision for hearing of claims

based on moral grounds has become the area of last resort;

if a claim

cannot be supported under the slightly less general standards of "uncon
scionable consideration" and "fair and honorable dealings", it is not
surprising that the standard of "moral or ethical questions" is rarely
used and rarely proven.

28

The Indian Claims Commission Act did, however,

contribute to the

acknowledgment of wrongdoing on the part of the United States.

It fur

ther, and most importantly, extended to the Indian all of the fundamental

26I b id.,

27

pp. 457-58,

Denforth,

"Historical Debts," pp.

2^ Ibld«, pp. 396-400.

396-96,
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principles of American law, providing a court for hearing claims and
expanding the law to cover the claims.

The property rights of Indian

tribes were thereby accorded the fullest legal standing, no longer re
quiring the permission of Congress to present specific grievances
against the United States.

CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION

In the thirty years since the passage of the Indian Claims Commis
sion Act,

Congress has passed legislation which has created an oppor

tunity for some potentially far-reaching decisions of the Supreme Court
Although the opinion John Marshall in Worcester v. Georgia that Indian
tribes were sovereign entities has long since been abandoned with respe
to their status as political states capable of entering into agreements
w i t h the United States,
impugned.

their intratribal sovereignty had never been

Tribal authority to control its internal affairs was reaf

firmed by the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968.^

The Act accepted the

1961 report of the United States Commission on Civil Rights which ac
knowledged the tribal right to self government, stating that "it preceded and was not created by the Federal Government."

o

The grand exception to tribal government's jurisdiction has been
its control of property.

Although the tribes right to manage property

which was held in fee simple interest is absolute, lands to which the
United States held title as trustee could be disposed of in any way
Congress saw fit, as has been previously discussed.

182 Stat.

77, 25 U.S.C.

Federal protection

§1302, et seq.

^Michael Smith, "Tribal Sovereignty and the 1968 Indian Bill of
Rights," Civil Rights Digest (Summer, 1970), p. 9.
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of lands held by tribes in fee simple interest was expressly rejected by
3

the 1953 Termination Act

which terminated the legal standing of some

tribes as "tribes" and which defined the policy of Congress as one in
tended to:
. . . subject [the Indians] to the same laws and [entitle
them] to the same privileges and responsibilities as are
applicable to other citizens of the United States . . . .^
The threat to tribal identity has been modified since the passage
of the Termination Act, both by Executive statements of intent to honor
3

the "balanced relationship" between the government and the tribes
by action of the Supreme Court.

and

Justice Douglas, writing the opinion in

6

Menominee Tribe v. United S t a t e s ,

closely scrutinized the Termination

Act which had dissolved the M e n o m i n e e ’s tribal identity and found that
the Act had repealed only the effect of statutes on the tribe.

Rights

of the Menominee tribe pursuant to treaties remained untouched by the
Act;

therefore,

the Court recognized treaty rights in the absence of e x 

press Congressional repeal.
Treaty rights and tribal identities are protected from infringement.
However,

the protection does not apply where the United States is not the

^House Concurrent Resolution 108, 67 Stat.
^Daniel H. Israel,

132

(1953).

"The Reemergence of Tribal Nationalism"

(paper

presented at Institute on Indian Land Development— Oil, Gas, Coal and
Other Minerals, sponsored by the Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation,
Tucson, Arizona, April 1-2, 1976), p. 5, citing H. Res. 108, 83rd Cong.,
1st Sess.

(1953); H. Rept. No. 841; S, Rept. No.

^Israel,

"Reemergence,u p. 17.

794.

^391 U.S. 404

(1968).

77
trustee of tribal lands.

An explicit statement of this exception is

found in Federal Power Commission v. Tuscarora Indian N a t i o n ,^ by which
the Court approved the New York Power Authority’s condemnation through
the power of eminent domain of 1,000 acres of Tuscarora tribal lands.
While the Court had guaranteed tribal protection from state and indivi
dual interference,

it found that since the lands were held by the Tus-

caroras in fee simple interest,

they were subject to the actions of

Q
state authority.

Any licensee of the United States, therefore,

is

free to extinguish Indian title without prior Congressional approval
if the land is held in fee simple interest.

Tuscarora made a distinc

tion in the requirement for prior Congressional approval by limiting
that requirement to the disposition of Indian lands by Indians to others,
eliminating its application to the activities of Federal l i c e n s e e s . ^
The Tuscarora decision elicited a strong dissent from Justices
Warren,

Douglas and Black.

tion to be ’’a r tificial,

Justice B l a c k ’s opinion found the distinc
and one which violated statutory rights of the

tribe merely for the sake of convenience.

7362 U.S.

99

(1960).

g
Price, American In d i a n , p. 442.
Israel,

"Reemergence,” p. 3.

^ U n i t e d States Supreme Court Digest, Vol,
11 362 U.S.

99, 142.

8,

§38, p.

668.
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I regret that this Court is to be the governmental
agency that breaks faith with this dependent people.
Great nations, like great men, should keep their
w o r d .1
This paper has been a discussion of the elements which make up
the body of law and legislation relative to Indian property rights.
The ability of the government to keep its word pursuant to innumerable
treaties has been found inadequate.

Under the doctrines of international

law relating to treaties, as discussed in Chapter I, the United States
inherited all of its sovereign powers from B r i t a i n , including the title
to property of tribes.

Although early documents expressed our good

faith and guaranteed them possession of their lands until voluntary
cession to the United States,

the Supreme Court found the status of

treaties to be no higher than that of statutes.
fore, simply override good faith agreements,

Congress could,

there

and was relatively free

from judicial interference since such matters were considered by the
Court to be political questions constitutionally granted to the juris
diction of the legislative branch.
The establishment of treaty-making as the means of Congressional
conduct of Indian relations in 1790 produced a series of agreements which
had as their main contributions the control of trade with tribes and,
most importantly,

the assertion of the Federal government as the ulti

mate controller of the nation*s property.

■^Price, American I n d i a n , pp. 442-43, citing dissent in Federal
Power Commission v. Tuscarora Indian Nation.
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The Supreme Court supported the role of Congress by assisting in
maintaining the federalist doctrine vis-a-vis its decisions in Cherokee
Nation v. Georgia and Worcester v. Georgia, and validated the ability
s
of Congress to interpret treaties without the consideration of the
tribes in Lone Wolf v. H i t c h c o c k .

Cong r e s s ’ authority, by virtue of

the philosophical position of the Supreme Court, was plenary.
The contributions made by Great Britain were chiefly the require
ments of legal systems to manage questions of property rights, and the
infusion into our culture of Puritan ethics, requiring consideration of
the morality of governmental actions and the necessity of compensation
for lands taken.

Even so, the Supreme Court maintained its respect for

the authority of Congress,

expressing its acceptance of the rule of the

discoverer and the efficacy of title acquisition to all land by whatever
means chosen by Congress.
During the years of the greatest exploration and settlement of the
continent,

Congress executed its obligation by the use of the Trade and

Intercourse Acts, establishing basic compensatory guidelines for taking
property.

With the end of treaty making in 18.71, an acknowledgment was

made that treaty making had been or had become a sham based on the unbe
lievable proposition that Indian tribes were sovereign and capable of
bargaining with the United States.

In the hopes of ending a procedure

which had resulted in the "monopoly” of lands, Congress assumed a policy
of division and allotment of tribal lands to incorporate their society
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into the mainstream of American life.
of "good faith",

Yet to maintain its position

it also provided that no claims could be considered

unless approved by special jurisdictional acts granting authority to
the Federal courts to consider claims against the United States.
suant to these acts,
of questions of law.

Pur

the Supreme Court was limited in its consideration
Specific terminology could result in the denial

of a claim even if based on a valid treaty;

general terminology alone

gave the Court an opportunity to provide relief to tribes denied ade
quate compensation for lands illegally taken by the Federal government.
Not until the passage of the Indian Claims Commission Act were the
courts granted jurisdiction to consider claims based on matters of ethi
cal conduct.

With the expanded scope available for redress of grievances,

litigation against the United States and demands for return of property
rather than monetary compensation have become of great significance in
contemporary law.
Nevertheless,

it is apparent that Congress has been the leader in

incorporation of any legislation and policy toward the American Indian.
The Court has merely followed the guidelines of the legislative branch.
Its decisions have resulted in a seemingly confusing melange of positions
related to the acquisition of title, w hen and how Congress may legitimately
acquire property on behalf of the United States, and what rights to com%

pensation are possessed by the tribes.

The Court has determined that

where Congress has taken some action which indicates an intent to end
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the title of an Indian tribe, or has specifically ended title by treaty
or overriding statute,
land.

then the United States has valid title to the

However, where tribes can prove aboriginal title or where Con

gress has ended its statutory control of lands but not its control pur
suant to treaties,
In short,

Indians have title to the land.

the Court may uphold previously granted rights under a

treaty but the merest indication of some intent by Congress to invali
date property holdings of a tribe must be upheld as incontestable.
A final example of the relationship between the Congress and the
Supreme Court will suffice to illustrate the long standing partnership
of the two bodies in the conduct of Indian relations with the United
States.

In 1974 a case was brought before the Supreme Court by the Oneida

Tribe of New York charging that the United States owed the tribe the ren13
tal value of their lands from 1795 to the present.
Having discussed numer
ous

other cases in which the Court found the merest indication of Con

gressional action to extinguish Indian title it is nearly inconceivable
that the plea of the Oneidas would be accepted.
Pursuant to several treaties concluded between 1780 and 1790, the
United States had guaranteed tribal ownership of certain lands until they
were purchased by the United States.

Further,

the 1790 Intercourse Act

had stipulated that the lands could not be conveyed to other parties
without the consent of the United States.

However,

in 1795,

the tribe

ceded the lands in question to the State of New York without the express
13
Oneida,

The Oneida Indian Nation of New York State v. The County of
New Y o r k , 414 U.S.

661.
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approval of the Federal government.

Here was an opportunity to reaf

firm the federalist doctrine rejecting state interference in the con
duct of Indian relations, but the opportunity was overlooked.

The

tribe contended that the 1795 cession to New York was ineffective be 
cause it had been made without the consent of the United States and,
therefore,

that the tribe's right to ownership of the land had never

been terminated.
The Supreme Court determined that the case involved a question
which must be determined;

it could not be simply assumed that treaty

rights had been terminated;
for determination.

and returned the matter to the lower courts

The impact of the C o u r t ’s ruling was, however, a

restatement of its fundamental principles in Indian affairs,

chiefly

that the power of Congress is supreme with respect to Indian title to
lands and that such title can be extinguished only with federal consent.
It appears,

therefore,

that the Court has contributed little to

the body of law protecting Indian tribal rights.

Although it has on

occasion chided Congress by insisting that it follow the rules it had
created,

the Court clearly has never seriously challenged the authority

of Congress to manage Indian property rights in any manner of its choosing.
Although many injustices were done,

it is hoped that the historical

legal tradition of allowing Indian claims against the United States will
continue to produce the return of just compensation to tribes and an arena
for hearing grievances caused by the absence of good faith of a sovereign
nation,
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